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ABSTRACT
TIERED PROVIDER NETWORKS IN HEALTH INSURANCE
Elena Prager
Robert Town
Health insurers are increasingly using plan designs that incentivize consumers to shop for
health care based on price. This dissertation studies the effects of one such plan design on
demand and equilibrium prices. Tiered hospital networks group hospitals by price ranking
and vary consumers’ out-of-pocket prices to reflect the price variation faced by the insurer.
Proponents argue that tiered networks reduce health care spending by steering consumers
toward lower-priced hospitals, and by giving insurers an additional bargaining lever in price
negotiations with hospitals. To evaluate these claims, I estimate a structural model of health
care demand and insurer-hospital bargaining over prices in the Massachusetts private health
insurance market. The model extends the standard Nash bargaining framework to explicitly
account for the multiplicity of possible tier outcomes. I find that the effects of tiered
networks on demand alone can lead to moderate or sizable reductions in hospital spending,
ranging from 1% to 8% depending on the consumer population and the concentration of
the hospital market. The effects on negotiated hospital prices add an additional 2% to
4% savings, for a total savings from tiered networks of up to 12% under favorable market
conditions. I conclude that insurance plan designs with demand-side incentives can have
large health care spending reduction effects.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
Unlike in other markets, prices in health care have historically been neither observed nor
paid directly by consumers. Instead, traditional health insurance plans charge consumers
out-of-pocket prices that are opaque or at most loosely correlated with the differences in
total price across health care providers.1 Consequently, incentives for price competition
between providers have been blunted (Gaynor, 2006; Enthoven, 2014; White et al., 2014).
Insurance design innovations that aim to sensitize demand to health care prices, such as
value-based insurance, narrow provider networks, high-deductible health plans, reference
pricing, and tiered provider networks, attempt to rein in health care spending using market
principles (Yong et al., 2010). These plan designs aim to inject price competition into the
health care market by incentivizing consumers to select providers at least partially based on
price. If successful, such plan designs can be expected to affect not only consumer decisions
but also, by extension, equilibrium prices for health care. In this dissertation, I study both
of these effects in the context of tiered provider networks.
Tiered provider networks directly encourage health care providers to compete over patients.
Insurance plans that use tiered provider networks rank providers based on price and place
them into mutually exclusive groups, or tiers, that determine consumers’ out-of-pocket payment for a particular provider. In contrast to traditional insurance plans, tiered networks
vary consumers’ out-of-pocket prices to reflect the variation in prices paid by insurers to
providers. Plans with tiered provider networks began to take hold in the mid-2000s, as
insurers sought new mechanisms for bolstering their bargaining power against increasingly
consolidated providers (Yegian, 2003; Robinson, 2003; Sinaiko, 2012). Among very large
employers, 33% of the highest-enrollment health plans now include a tiered provider network, with 54% of all employers expecting tiered networks to be a very effective or somewhat
effective measure for health care cost reduction (KFF, 2014, 2015).
1

Plans that use coinsurance charge consumers a percentage of the total negotiated price, which is perfectly
correlated with price but which does not allow consumers to oberve the coinsurance amount ex ante due to
a lack of price transparency (White et al., 2014).
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This dissertation evaluates the effects of tiered networks on both the demand side and
the supply side of the health care market. Advocates of tiered networks argue that they
reduce health care spending through two mechanisms: the direct effect of steering consumers
toward lower-priced providers (Sinaiko, 2012), and an indirect effect on prices (Fronstin,
2003; Robinson, 2003). If consumers indeed respond to the incentives in tiered provider
networks, then non-preferred tier placement becomes an additional bargaining lever that
insurers can use in price negotiations with providers. In evaluating the spending reduction
effects of tiered networks and similar demand-side incentives, it is therefore necessary to
consider their impacts on negotiated prices between insurers and providers in addition to
their direct effects on demand. In this dissertation, I focus on the tiering of hospitals, whose
price negotiations have an outsize importance to their bottom line (Gaynor et al., 2015).2
I evaluate the overall effect of tiered hospital networks by building and estimating a model
of insurer-hospital competition under tiered networks. The model describes bilateral Nash
bargaining between insurers and hospitals over prices. The equilibrium price maximizes
the Nash product of the insurer’s and hospital’s surpluses, which are in turn functions of
negotiated prices, hospital tiers, insurance plan premiums, plan enrollments, and hospital
utilization. Tiered networks introduce an additional set of incentives relative to traditional
insurance plans. In agreeing to a lower negotiated price, a hospital trades off lower perpatient revenue against higher volume due to more preferred tier placement. Plan premiums
and enrollments also respond to prices and tiers, affecting both insurers’ and hospitals’
volumes. I derive the equilibrium negotiated price for this model, which extends the existing
Nash bargaining framework from the literature to account explicitly for the presence of tiered
networks.
A credible model of the negotiation process between insurers and hospitals requires estimates
of the demand-side response to hospital tiers, prices, and other insurance plan characteristics. I first estimate a discrete choice model of individual demand for hospitals, using
2

At 5.6% of GDP, factors affecting hospital spending are also of independent interest (CMS, 2014a).

2

inertia in insurance plan choices to address the potential endogeneity between plan choice
and out-of-pocket hospital price. Next, I estimate a model of demand for insurance plans at
the household level. I use the estimates from the hospital demand model to generate a measure of consumers’ valuation of plans’ hospital networks, measured by willingness-to-pay,
which enters the plan demand model alongside detailed data on plan financial characteristics. Finally, I combine the estimates from the hospital and plan demand analyses with
my structural model of insurer-hospital bargaining for a subset of hospitals. I solve for
the hospitals’ marginal costs of treatment and use the estimates to conduct counterfactual
analyses that evaluate the effects of tiered networks relative to non-tiered plans, both on
patient sorting across hospitals and on hospitals’ negotiated prices with insurers.
My empirical strategy and identification rely on very detailed data. I estimate the model
using comprehensive data on the private health insurance market in Massachusetts. I combine data on health care utilization and health insurance enrollment from the 2009–2012
Massachusetts All-Payer Claims Database (APCD); data on insurance plan characteristics
from the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC); and novel, hand-collected
longitudinal data on Massachusetts insurers’ hospital tiers. I use the longitudinal tiered
network data to cleanly identify a price coefficient in hospital demand, which is typically
impeded by a lack of data on provider networks and out-of-pocket prices (Gaynor et al.,
2015). The GIC data provide information required for the plan demand model, including plan characteristics and plan choice set data that are not observed in medical claims
databases such as the APCD. The final key piece of data reported in the APCD is actual
transaction prices paid to hospitals, which are critical to measuring spending and to the
credibility of the bargaining model but which are typically not available in medical claims
data (Reinhardt, 2006; Gowrisankaran et al., 2015). The unique combination of longitudinal network data, detailed hospital choice and plan choice data for the same consumers, and
accurate price data forms the backbone for the demand- and supply-side empirical analyses
in this dissertation.

3

I find that both demand and prices are responsive to tiered hospital networks. On the
demand side, I find that consumers’ probability of choosing a hospital is decreasing in
out-of-pocket price. The estimated elasticity of demand is in the range of −0.1 to −1,
consistent with the literature (Manning et al., 1987; Chandra et al., 2010; Trivedi et al.,
2010; Buntin et al., 2011). In counterfactual analyses, I find that the effect of moving
a consumer from a non-tiered plan to a plan with a $500 spread in out-of-pocket price
between the most and least preferred tiers is a 0.7% average reduction in hospital spending
for the state of Massachusetts as a whole, and a 3.5% reduction in the dense Boston hospital
market. Increasing the spread across tiers to $1,250 results in a 1.8% reduction in hospital
spending relative to the baseline of no tiers statewide, and 8.1% in the Boston market.
These results support the claim that demand-side incentives can lower health care spending.
The magnitude of the demand steering effect of tiered networks ranges from modest to
substantial depending on the consumer population and the concentration of the hospital
market.
The second set of results concerns the effect of tiered hospital networks on negotiated hospital prices. Relative to traditional health insurance plans, plans with tiered networks affect
price bargaining by making a hospital’s patient volume a function of its tier. For a subset of
hospitals in Boston, I repeat the counterfactual exercise comparing prices when the insurer
does not use a tiered network to prices when the same insurer has some tiered network
plans. In addition to allowing consumers to respond to these changes, this exercise allows
negotiated prices, tiers, premiums, and enrollment to adjust. The approximate equilibrium
effect of moving from a traditional non-tiered plan to tiered network structure with a $500
spread in out-of-pocket prices is a 2% to 3% decline in hospital prices. Increasing the spread
across tiers to $1,250 results in a somewhat larger 4% decline. These results suggest that
demand-side incentives in health insurance may have material downward effects on prices
by passing through consumer responses to the price negotiations between insurers and hospitals. The effects of tiered hospital networks on prices are equivalent to approximately
half the magnitude of the effects on demand steering alone. The focus on the demand-side
4

effects alone in current policy and research discussions could therefore be underestimating
the total expected savings from tiered networks by as much as one third.

1.1. Background on Tiered Provider Networks
Plans with tiered provider networks were introduced in the early 2000s, as insurers sought
new mechanisms for bolstering their bargaining power with respect to increasingly consolidated providers (Yegian, 2003; Robinson, 2003; Sinaiko, 2012). Tiered networks allowed
insurers to maintain some of the bargaining leverage associated with health maintenance
organizations (HMOs), which used the threat of contract termination to drive down negotiated prices but which experienced a backlash of public opinion in the 1990s (Cutler et al.,
2000; Town and Vistnes, 2001; Ho, 2009). Detractors argued that HMOs’ savings came
at the expense of patient choice, access to care, and continuity of care (McCanne, 2013;
Martin, 2014).
Tiered provider networks combine the cost control mechanisms of narrow networks with
patient choice and explicit price information for consumers. In a tiered network, almost
all providers in the market remain in the consumer’s choice set, but a higher out-of-pocket
price is associated with the use of higher-priced providers. Providers are placed into nonoverlapping groups, or tiers, that determine consumers’ out-of-pocket prices for treatment.
The out-of-pocket price faced by enrollees is then constant among providers within a tier,
but varies across tiers. Throughout the dissertation, I distinguish between the out-ofpocket price faced by insured consumers and the full price negotiated between providers
and insurers, which I call simply “price”.
The concept of tiering in health care is not new; insurers have been grouping prescription
drugs into tiers on their drug formularies since at least the 1990s, and by 2000 the fraction of
insurers using tiered formularies reached 80% (Motheral and Fairman, 2001). The application of tiering to provider networks did not become widespread until the mid-2000s (Sinaiko,
2012). Insurers can tier their hospital networks, their physician networks, or both (Sinaiko,
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2012). Motivated by the nearly one third share of total health care spending attributable
to hospital costs, insurers and employers have been particularly interested in tiering as a
means for controlling hospital spending (Fronstin, 2003; Gaynor et al., 2015). The typical
tiered hospital network has three tiers, with most or all hospitals in the market included in
one of the three tiers (Fronstin, 2003). In my data, out-of-pocket price differentials for a
single hospital admission between the most and least preferred tiers range from $250 to as
much as $1,250.
Since their introduction in the early 2000s, the penetration of tiered-network plan designs
has continued to rise. Health care system experts, insurers and employers increasingly see
the use of tiered networks and other value-based plan designs as integral to cost control
(Robinson, 2003; KFF, 2014; Stremikis et al., 2010). As of 2015, 33% of the highestenrollment health plans offered by very large employers and 7% of plans offered on the
health insurance exchanges include a tiered provider network, and multiple states expect
growth in tiered-network plans (KFF, 2014; Corlette et al., 2014; McKinsey, 2015; KFF,
2015). Moreover, some states have been directly involved in promoting the adoption of
tiered provider networks.

1.2. Empirical Setting: The Massachusetts Health Care Market
The empirical application in this dissertation is the private health insurance market in
Massachusetts, which provides an especially appropriate setting for studying tiered hospital
networks. Its largest insurers have a substantial fraction of enrollees in plans using tiered
networks, which is helpful for both a sufficient sample size and for identifying variation in
tier prices over time, across insurers, and across plans within an insurer. Furthermore, since
Massachusetts insurers were early adopters of tiered provider networks, the market has had
an opportunity to adjust to the presence of these plans and reach an equilibrium to which
a structural model can be applied. Combined with the state’s detailed health care data,
these features of the market motivate the choice of Massachusetts as the empirical setting
for this dissertation.
6

In 2006, Massachusetts passed a landmark health care overhaul which aimed to expand
health insurance coverage and access to care. The Massachusetts reform subsequently served
as the blueprint for the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) passed in
2010 (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012). Although the 2006 legislation succeeded in broadening
insurance coverage in Massachusetts, policymakers remained concerned about the state’s
high overall health care spending. Not only was the state’s per capita health care spending
15% higher than the national average, driven largely by high hospital spending, it had
also grown faster than national health care spending since 2002 (DHCFP, 2010). Based
on recommendations by the Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy,
the state implemented additional reforms aimed at measuring and reducing health care
spending in 2010 and again in 2012 (Massachusetts, 2010, 2012a; Wrobel et al., 2014; CHIA,
2015b). These reforms included, among other provisions,3 the creation of the All-Payer
Claims Database used in this dissertation and requirements for insurers to offer value-based
insurance designs (DHCFP, 2010).
Since 2011, Massachusetts legislation has required all large insurers to offer at least one
narrow- or tiered-network plan in at least one geographic area (Massachusetts, 2010). The
regulation does not require insurers to offer tiered-network plans; they may instead offer
narrow-network plans. However, all three of the state’s largest insurers—Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Massachusetts, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, and Tufts Health Plan—have offered
both tiered- and narrow-network plans since before the regulation went into effect in 2011.
These insurers now have 10–35% of their commercial enrollees in tiered-network plans.
State regulation also outlines a method for insurers to calculate comparable prices across
providers by adjusting for disease and patient mix; insurers are required to report these
prices to the state’s Center for Health Information and Analysis (CHIA) and are expected
to use them for determining providers’ network status.
3

Other notable pieces of the legislation consisted of health care price transparency requirements and the
encouragement of vertical integration between providers in the form accountable care organizations (created
under the moniker “Alternative Quality Contract” (Song et al., 2012)).

7

Outside of state legislation, the push toward tiered networks in Massachusetts has been
led by the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC), which administers health
insurance and other benefits for state and municipal employees, retirees, and their dependents.4 The GIC insures some 300,000–350,000 individuals per year throughout my sample
period, corresponding to approximately 8% of the total commercially insured population in
Massachusetts. The volume of covered lives on the GIC, along with the substantial fraction
of the state budget devoted to it, makes the GIC an important and active player in the
Massachusetts health insurance landscape (DHCFP, 2010; Wrobel et al., 2014). The GIC
was among the earliest adopters of tiered provider networks, introducing its first tiered
hospital network plan in July 2003 and rolling out tiered physician networks in July 2006
GIC (2008, 2009). For the insurers of interest in this dissertation, Harvard Pilgrim Health
Care and Tufts Health Plan, nearly 100% of tiered provider network plan enrollment comes
from the GIC in the early part of the sample period, falling to roughly 90% by 2013 (Boros
et al., 2014).
Massachusetts requires insurers operating tiered-network plans to “clearly and conspicuously indicate” consumers’ out-of-pocket prices for each tier (Massachusetts, 2012b). Insurers provide this information to enrollees as part of the schedule of benefits documentation
for each plan. At the insurer level, they also publish lists of hospitals and their network tiers
each year, which can be easily accessed through their websites for the current year. These
lists include each hospital’s tier, so consumers do not need to search for multiple providers’
network status in order to comparison-shop. This is in contrast to the difficulty of learning out-of-pocket prices for hospital care in advance in traditional plan types: even savvy
consumers who ask for price quotes typically get poor response rates (Bebinger, 2014).
4

This is the same employer group studied by Gruber and McKnight (2014) in evaluating the impact of
narrow networks and by Sinaiko and Rosenthal (2014) in studying patient response to physician tiering.
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1.3. Relationship to the Literature
Bargaining
This work builds on the growing literature on price bargaining in markets lacking posted
prices (Capps et al., 2003; Ho, 2009; Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012; Collard-Wexler et al.,
2014; Grennan, 2013). Horn and Wolinsky (1988) model price negotiations between upstream and downstream firms as a Nash bargaining game. Crawford and Yurukoglu (2011)
operationalize this model in a structural estimation of bargaining between cable companies and television channels. Collard-Wexler et al. (2014) provide a theoretical motivation
for the Nash-in-Nash solution to bilateral oligopoly settings by considering an alternatingoffers bargaining game between upstream and downstream firms. In the health care context,
Gal-Or (1997) shows theoretically that duopolist insurers may exclude some hospitals from
their networks in equilibrium. Variations of the bilateral Nash bargaining model have been
operationalized empirically in the context of health insurers’ hospital networks (Ho, 2009;
Gowrisankaran et al., 2015; Ho and Lee, 2015) and other applications (Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012; Grennan, 2013). In addition, many papers that study hospital markets rely
on the underlying structure of bargaining models without estimating the models structurally (Town and Vistnes, 2001; Sorensen, 2003; Capps et al., 2003; Lewis and Pflum,
2013; Shepard, 2014; Trish and Herring, 2015).
I extend the bargaining framework from this literature to contexts in which the space of
possible distinct agreement outcomes is larger than one. Existing Nash bargaining models
cannot accommodate the multiple possible outcomes inherent in a tiered hospital network
because they allow for only two distinct outcomes of a negotiation, agreement and disagreement.5 In a tiered network, the agreement outcome between the insurer and the hospital
nests multiple possible tier placements. I incorporate the structure of tiered networks by
5

In the case of bargaining between insurers and hospitals, the two outcomes correspond to the inclusion
or exclusion of the hospital from the insurer’s provider network (Town and Vistnes, 2001; Capps et al., 2003;
Ho, 2006, 2009).
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modeling all possible permutations of tier assignments for the hospital and its close competitors and using insurers’ tier determination functions to assign a probability to each
permutation. I also contribute to this literature empirically by allowing equilibrium hospital networks to adjust in the counterfactual exercises.
Provider network formation
Among the best examples of markets with negotiated prices is the market for medical care,
where the prices insurers pay to health care providers are set via insurer-provider bargaining.
At roughly 5% of GDP, hospital expenditures also represent a market of intrinsic interest
(CMS, 2014a; Gaynor et al., 2015). Narrow-network plans, in which enrollees can only seek
care from a limited subset of providers in the market, have been extensively studied in the
health IO literature. In a tiered network, patients face differential out-of-pocket costs for
care sought from providers in different groups (“tiers”). From the consumer’s point of view,
a narrow network is simply a tiered network with two tiers (in vs. out). The study of tiered
networks therefore builds on and generalizes the literature on narrow networks.
The first strain of literature on narrow networks has looked at demand responses. Ho
(2006) estimates market shares for health insurance plans conditional on hospital network
breadth, and finds that consumers value more inclusive networks when making plan choices.
Gruber and McKnight (2014) study enrollment and spending in narrow-network plans, and
find that consumers are responsive to the lower premiums of narrow-network plans. They
also find that narrow networks lead to lower health care spending by redirecting care away
from higher-cost specialists to primary care physicians, but results for hospital care are less
definitive. Ericson and Starc (2014) estimate willingness-to-pay for plans as a function of
hospital network breadth, providing additional evidence that consumers value more inclusive
networks.
Another strain of the literature has directly estimated the process of determining a hospital’s
in- vs. out-of-network status. Town and Vistnes (2001) study the inclusion of hospitals in
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managed care plans’ narrow networks as a function of the network’s value to consumers.
Capps et al. (2003) construct hospital-level indices of consumers’ ex ante willingness-to-pay
for a hospital’s inclusion in a network, and estimate insurer-hospital bargaining with an
insurer objective function that is a weighted sum of willingness-to-pay and payments to
providers. Ho (2009) adds consumer choice of insurance plan and estimates a bargaining
model that accounts explicitly for consumer re-sorting across plans. That is, she allows a
hospital that loses patients due to network exclusion to recapture some of those patients if
they switch to a different plan.
A third strain of related health IO literature has examined various aspects of market competition related to narrow hospital networks. Trish and Herring (2015) study the relationship
between insurer competition and hospital prices in a reduced-form framework. Ho and Lee
(2013) use a model of insurer-hospital bargaining to examine the effects of competition between insurers on negotiated prices with hospitals. Lewis and Pflum (2011) study the effects
of hospital consolidation on negotiated prices in a reduced-form framework. Gowrisankaran
et al. (2015) model the bargaining game directly to estimate the effects of hospital mergers on prices. This dissertation is most closely related to Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town
(2015), who are the first to incorporate consumer response to hospital prices into insurerhospital bargaining; and Ho and Lee (2015), who are the first to jointly estimate hospital
demand, plan demand as a function of hospital networks, and insurer-hospital bargaining.
I extend the existing literature on provider networks by introducing accurately observed
consumer out-of-pocket prices, modeling plan demand as a function of the dollarized value
of hospital networks, and incorporating these improvements in demand estimation into a
model of insurer-hospital bargaining under more complex network arrangements.6
6

Although health care demand under easily observed prices (Christensen et al., 2013; Robinson and
Brown, 2013; Lieber, 2015, ; Lieber 2014), dollarized willingness-to-pay for hospital networks Ericson and
Starc (2014), and tiered networks (Scanlon et al., 2008; Sinaiko and Rosenthal, 2014; Frank et al., 2015) have
been studied in isolation, I am not aware of any existing research that incorporates any of these elements
into a bargaining model.
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Tiered provider networks
The literature on tiered networks is small. The study of tiered networks therefore generalizes
the literature on narrow networks. Three papers have studied directly the impact of tiered
provider networks on demand, two of which focus on hospitals. Scanlon et al. (2008)
study the implementation of a de facto tiered hospital network by a large employer. In
their setting, one group of employees had their coinsurance waived when they received
care at preferred hospitals, while other employees’ out-of-pocket costs for hospital care
remained unchanged. Using a difference-in-differences design with a conditional logit model
of hospital choice, Scanlon et al. (2008) find that enrollment in the tiered network raised the
probability of choosing a preferred-tier hospital by 20 percentage points. Similarly, Frank
et al. (2015) study enrollees in BCBS’s tiered plans in Massachusetts. Their results, using
a conditional logit model of hospital choice, indicate that enrollment in a tiered network
raised the probability of choosing a preferred-tier hospital by 80 percent.
Sinaiko and Rosenthal (2014) study demand response to tiered physician networks among
Massachusetts state employees, where physicians are grouped into three tiers with differences in cost-sharing of up to $20 across tiers. They find that physicians in least-preferred
tier attract fewer new patients than physicians in preferred tiers, but that patients who have
existing relationships with their physicians are not responsinve to tier placements. In tiered
physician networks, patients have small differences in out-of-pocket price across tiers and
repeated interactions that allow them to learn about and develop loyalty to their providers.
In this setting, demand response to tiers appears to be negligible. The comparative infrequency of hospital care, along with the much larger differences in out-of-pocket price in the
hospital setting, may contribute to the larger demand response observed in tiered hospital
networks.
Scanlon et al. (2008), Frank et al. (2015), and Sinaiko and Rosenthal (2014) each examine
the demand side of a specific tiered-network program, focusing on the demand response to
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hospitals’ categorical tiers. These papers provide evidence that consumers respond to tiered
provider networks in the expected direction. However, since their primary explanatory
variable is provider tier rather than out-of-pocket cost to the consumer, the price elasticity
of demand for providers is not addressed. In my application, consumers observe their outof-pocket cost for each hospital ex ante published in insurers’ plan materials, and this price
typically differs by several hundred dollars across hospitals within a plan. Thus, I estimate
the demand response to out-of-pocket cost, which in turn is a function of hospital tier,
rather than the response to categorical tier placement alone.
I build on the existing literature on tiered networks by evaluating the effect of tiered hospital
networks on negotiated prices, and by measuring demand response to changes in out-ofpocket prices, rather than hospital tiers alone. To my knowledge, there has been no research
on the aggregate effect of tiered networks on competition. In this dissertation, I model
insurers’ strategic interactions with hospitals and competing insurers. Tiered networks
give insurers an additional lever in price negotiations with hospitals. The larger consumers’
response to differences in out-of-pockets costs across tiers, the greater the volume incentives
for hospitals to accept a lower negotiated price with the insurer. Using data on multiple
insurers in the same market allows me to model these strategic interactions explicitly.
Elasticity of the demand for health care
The landmark study of the elasticity of demand for health care is the Rand Health Insurance
Experiment, one of the largest randomized trials in the social sciences (Manning et al., 1987).
The Rand study randomized households into one of sixteen health insurance plans that
differed on cost-sharing arrangements, among other plan attributes. Using the variation in
coinsurance, Manning et al. (1987) estimate that the elasticity of demand for health care
is on the order of -0.1 to -0.2, as measured on the extensive margin of whether to seek
any care. The Rand experiment provided the earliest compelling evidence that demand for
health care is downward-sloping, and remains the landmark study on demand for health
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care.
More recent estimates from observational studies are also available. Chandra et al. (2010)
find demand elasticities for outpatient visits and prescription drugs that are also in the
-0.1 to -0.2 range. Trivedi et al. (2010) study a change in Medicare copayments, and find
that Medicare beneficiaries have a demand elasticity of -0.03 for outpatient visits -0.09 for
hospital admissions. Estimates using high-deductible health plans, where consumers pay
the majority of their costs out of pocket up to a maximum deductible, suggest that such
arrangements can lower health care spending by 14% (Buntin et al., 2011). Buntin et al.
(2006) and Chandra et al. (2011) provide overviews of the recent literature on the elasticity
of demand for health care.
These papers on the demand response to health care prices primarily measure demand
elasticity on the extensive margin of whether to seek any care or the intensive margin
of quantity of care. The evidence on demand substitution across different treatments or
different providers, given that care is being sought, is more sparse. Gowrisankaran et al.
(2015) and Ho and Pakes (2013) study provider choice under differential pricing, and both
find that it is responsive to prices paid by insurers to providers. In these papers, consumers
are responding to price via coinsurance or because their choices are mediated by physician
referrals. It is less clear what the effect of additional price transparency for consumers should
be on provider choice. There is great policy interest in this question, with both CMS and
private initiatives like the Health Care Cost Containment Institute beginning to publicly
disseminate provider prices (CMS, 2014a; Eastwood, 2015). This dissertation contributes to
the literature on the elasticity of demand for medical care by cleanly estimating the demand
elasticity on the intensive margin of consumer substitution across providers in response to
variation in spot prices for care.7
7

I abstract from the nonlinearity of marginal price induced by variation in marginal tax rates and nonlinear
contracts such as deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums (Gruber and Poterba, 1994; Finkelstein, 2002;
Kowalski, 2012; Einav et al., 2013; Abaluck et al., 2015).
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1.4. Model Overview
I model consumer choice of hospitals, household choice of insurance plans, and price negotiations between insurers and hospitals. The model and empirical approach extend the
literature on price negotiations under narrow networks8 to explicitly account for the multiplicity of possible tier outcomes in a tiered network and the concomitant variation in
consumers’ out-of-pocket prices for care. In the model, insurers and hospitals bargain bilaterally over prices, which determine hospitals’ tiers in insurer networks. The equilibrium
prices are a function of demand response to hospital tiers and out-of-pocket prices in hospital choice and plan choice. The model assumes there are no information asymmetries in
the market.
The model takes as given the product menu offered by insurers and the mapping from a
hospital’s price relative to other hospitals in the insurer’s network to its tier. Fixing the
product characteristics is equivalent to assuming that plan characteristics other than the
hospital network and premium are determined separately from hospital prices. In my setting for estimating plan choice, the GIC is intimately involved in setting plan characteristics
for all insurers offering GIC plans, leaving little room for insurers to reoptimize their plan
characteristics in response to changes in hospital networks. Many plan characteristics, such
as deductibles, out-of-pocket payments for prescription drugs, and even the ratio of individual to family premiums, are the same for all six insurers participating on the GIC. More
generally, health insurance plans are complex products with high fixed costs of redesigning
product characteristics, making the assumption that product characteristics can be held
fixed as hospital prices change a reasonable first-order approximation.
The market is modeled according to the following three-stage game.
1. In stage 1, insurers and hospitals engage in simultaneous, bilateral negotiations over
prices. The price determines the hospital’s tier according to a stochastic mapping
8

See Town and Vistnes (2001); Capps et al. (2003); Ho (2009); Ho and Lee (2013); Gowrisankaran et al.
(2015).
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from prices to tiers, and insurers set premiums for their plans accordingly.
2. In stage 2, households choose a health insurance plan given the expected utility from
each plan’s network.
3. In stage 3, individual consumers get sick with some probability and, if sick, they
choose a hospital given their plan’s network.
Stage 1 corresponds to the bargaining model, while stages 2 and 3 correspond to demand
estimation. The bargaining component takes the demand component as an input, since the
effect of tiered networks on bargaining will depend on the leverage insurers gain from demand response to a hospital’s tier placement. I therefore build up the model and estimation
strategy starting from the last stage of the game.

1.5. Data
The data used in this dissertation are compiled from multiple sources. Data on health care
utilization and health insurance enrollment come from the 2009–2012 Massachusetts AllPayer Claims Database (APCD); data on insurance plan characteristics and choice sets are
drawn from the employee benefit guides of the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission
(GIC), a large employer group; and longitudinal data on hospitals’ placement in insurers’
tiered and narrow networks were hand-collected from the current and archived network lists
of several Massachusetts insurers.
1.5.1. Medical Claims and Hospital Price Data
Medical claims data are drawn from the Massachusetts Center for Health Information and
Analysis’ (CHIA) All-Payer Claims Database (APCD) (CHIA, 2014). The APCD consists
of comprehensive data on interactions with the health care system of all privately insured
residents of Massachusetts in the 2009–2012 period.
The APCD medical claims data are extremely detailed. They include information on physician visits, outpatient hospital visits, inpatient hospital admissions, and prescription drugs.
16

The data include patient demographic information such as gender, date of birth, and fivedigit zip codes of residence. I match patients to zip-level demographic characteristics from
the U.S. Census Bureau and use the patient address information to calculate driving distance from patients to providers. The APCD allows me to track patients across years, and
often across insurers, using longitudinal patient identifiers. In addition, it links patients
insured as dependents to the primary enrollee in the insurance plan, allowing household
units to be identified when modeling insurance enrollment decisions. To my knowledge,
only one other study has estimated individual demand for providers and household demand
for health insurance in the same population (Ho and Lee, 2015). This link between the two
stages of demand is key to an accurate model of the health insurance market, where plan
enrollment decisions are often made at the level of the family rather than the individual.
Like other medical claims databases, the unit of observation in the APCD is the claim line,
which is the smallest unit of service for which an insurer or patient is billed separately
from other units of service. A single hospital visit, for example, can have many claim
lines for drugs, operating room supplies, anesthesia, and physician fees. In the analysis, I
aggregate information across claim lines to the level of the hospital admission. For each
claim, the principal diagnosis is reported along with up to twelve secondary diagnoses.
Similarly, for visits involving procedures, a principal procedure code is reported along with
up to six secondary procedures. Summary statistics for the admissions included in the
hospital demand model are reported in Table 8. Diagnoses and procedures are reported
in the International Classification of Diseases, Clinical Modification (ICD-9) classification
system, which consists of approximately 14,000 distinct diagnosis codes and 4,000 procedure
codes. I assign diagnoses to diagnostic categories and severity levels using the Clinical
Classifications Software (CCS) categorizations from the Agency of Healthcare Research and
Quality (Table 10). Hospitals are identified in the data using fuzzy matching on hospital
names and addresses, plus a final round of manual checks to correct errors and exclude
mistakenly attributed onsite facilities or physician groups that are not involved in inpatient
care. The APCD is supplemented with hospital characteristics data from the American
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Hospital Association Annual Survey Database; hospital quality data from the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services Hospital Compare database; and hospital financial and
casemix data from state public use files published by the Massachusetts Center for Health
Information and Analysis.
The APCD reports several key price variables. Most importantly, it reports allowed amounts,
which are actual amounts paid by insurers and patients to health care providers. The majority of claims databases only report charge prices, which are not reflective of actual transaction prices (Reinhardt, 2006). The majority of existing empirical work on insurer-hospital
strategic interactions has been limited by its inability to measure actual dollar flows from
payers and patients to providers (Gowrisankaran et al., 2015). The typical approach for
overcoming these data limitations has been to infer the break-down of price negotiations
when a hospital is excluded from an insurer’s provider network. By contrast, the price
information in the APCD allows price negotiations between insurers and providers to be
examined directly, irrespective of variation in network status. In addition to amounts paid
by insurers, the APCD separately reports patients’ out-of-pocket payments for care, a key
identifying variable in estimating hospital demand in tiered-network plans.
The health care utilization data from the APCD are used to estimate hospital demand in
conjunction with the hospital network data described below. The accurate price information
from the APCD is used to measure negotiated prices between insurers and hospitals, and
to estimate the structural model of insurer-hospital bargaining over prices.
1.5.2. Premiums and Choice Sets Data
Data on insurance plan availability and characteristics are drawn from the Massachusetts
Group Insurance Commission (GIC) for the subset of consumers in the APCD who are
insured through the GIC.9 The GIC is the benefits administrator for the state of Massachusetts, some municipalities, and a number of other public entities. It insures some
9
I am grateful to GIC Budget Director Catherine Moore for detailed information on the institutional
setting and goals of the GIC.
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300,000–350,000 people per year during my sample period, consisting of GIC-covered employees, retirees, and their dependents. This enrollment volume makes the GIC the clearinghouse for 8% of the state’s 4.4 million commercially insured lives (CHIA, 2015b). The
volume of covered lives on the GIC, along with the substantial fraction of the state budget
devoted to it, makes the GIC an important and active player in the Massachusetts health
insurance landscape (DHCFP, 2010; Wrobel et al., 2014). My sample of GIC enrollees
observed in the APCD includes approximately 90,000 state and municipal employees and
120,000 dependents. The remaining individuals insured through the GIC are retired government employees and their surviving spouses. The demographic characteristics for the
GIC enrollees in my sample are shown in Table 1. Approximately 60% of primary enrollees
insure their dependents as well. The majority of the primary enrollees live in the Boston
area or elsewhere in eastern Massachusetts. Approximately half of the enrollees are first
observed in the GIC prior to the start of the medical claims data in 2009.
I use data on the GIC’s health plan offerings, premiums, and plan characteristics such as
deductibles for GIC fiscal years 2009–2011, which cover the calendar period July 2008–June
2012.10 The plan offerings and their premiums for a sample enrollment year are described
in Table 2. The employee portion of premium contributions is 25% of the total premium.11
Two levels of premiums are set for each plan: one for individual coverage and another for
family coverage (defined as two or more enrollees), with no variation in these two premium
amounts across the entire state for each fiscal year. Plan characteristics, such as out-ofpocket prices and hospital networks, change over time. Plans on the GIC use copays, which
are fixed dollar amounts paid out-of-pocket by consumers when they use health care. For
example, inpatient copays in the Harvard Pilgrim Independence plan start at a flat $300
per admission in fiscal year 2009, move to a tiered structure of $250/$500/$750 across the
10

Data from July 2012 onward excluded because the GIC implemented a premium discount program
that affected employees differently depending on characteristics I do not observe in the APCD (Gruber and
McKnight, 2014). The plan demand analysis therefore relies on GIC data through June 2012.
11
Employees hired prior to July 2003 only pay 20% of the total premium cost. In the analyses, I therefore
exclude GIC enrollees who were enrolled prior to 2007 (the earliest enrollment data in the APCD) in order
to reduce noise in premium measurement.
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three hospital tiers in 2010, and increase to $275/$500/$1,500 in 2016.
Six insurers offer a total of eleven plans through the GIC (Table 2). The key insurers
of interest in this dissertation are Harvard Pilgrim Health Care and Tufts Health Plan,
although other insurers are also included in the analyses. These two insurers are the secondand third-largest in the state, with 20% and 14% of commercial enrollment, respectively
(CHIA, 2013).12 Harvard Pilgrim and Tufts each offer two plans through the GIC, one using
a broad tiered hospital network and the other using a narrow version of their tiered network.
These narrow-network plans were introduced in July 2010, and are studied extensively in
Gruber and McKnight (2014), who also provide a more detailed description of the GIC
market. The broad tiered-network plans by Harvard Pilgrim and Tufts have the two highest
market shares among employees insured through the GIC, with a combined share ranging
from 49% to 59% of employee enrollees throughout the sample period. Of the seven plans
offered by other insurers, only one (UniCare) uses a tiered hospital network, and this plan
has less than 10% market share on the GIC. UniCare does not contribute data to the APCD,
so its enrollees are excluded from the analyses and UniCare plans are assigned to be the
outside option.
Plans on the GIC market are fairly standardized: deductible levels, prescription drug copays,
and some other plan characteristics vary little or not at all across plans within a fiscal
year. This type of standardization is found in many health insurance markets, including
Medigap, state health insurance exchanges, and large employers (Starc, 2014; Ericson and
Starc, 2015; Handel, 2013). Such markets can shed light on plan competition on the health
insurance exchanges set up under the Affordable Care Act, where insurers have responded
to the standardization of benefits by competing more aggressively on network design (Davis,
2013). The primary differences between plans on the GIC come from the insurer brands,
provider networks, and copay structures for physician and hospital care.
12
The largest insurer in Massachusetts is Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS), with 45% of the commercial
market (CHIA, 2013). BCBS does not participate in the GIC market and is excluded from the analyses. Its
tiered hospital network is studied by Frank et al. (2015).
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The GIC plan data are used to estimate plan demand. The use of the GIC plan data
to supplement the APCD claims data provides crucial information on plan characteristics,
premiums, and plan choice sets, which are unobserved in the APCD and in claims data more
generally. Indeed, very few papers have jointly estimated demand for hospitals and demand
for plans, due in part to this common data limitation (Ho, 2006; Shepard, 2014; Ho and Lee,
2015). Without the accurate construction of the plan choice set, discrete choice models of
plan demand would be highly unreliable (Train, 2002). I observe not only the GIC’s full plan
offerings, but also the variation in the subset of the plans available across Massachusetts’
fourteen counties and over time, including the introduction of the two new narrow-network
plans in July 2010. While I have plan enrollment data through 2012, I censor the sample
for plan demand estimation because in fiscal year 2012, the GIC introduced a premium
discount program that affected employees differentially based on employee characteristics
that are not observed in the APCD (Gruber and McKnight, 2014). These data allow me
to estimate a model of plan demand and allow for enrollment adjustments in response to
changing hospital networks in the analysis.
1.5.3. Network Data
I have compiled a unique dataset tracking Massachusetts hospitals’ placements in several
insurers’ tiered and narrow networks for the period 2009–2015. Network data were handcollected from insurers’ current and archived plan documentation.13 My data cover Harvard
Pilgrim’s and Tufts’ tiered networks, as well as all GIC insurers’ narrow networks. Data on
insurers’ provider networks have to date been difficult for researchers to obtain, especially
retrospective data that can be merged into claims databases, which has limited the scope of
questions the literature has been able to address (Gaynor et al., 2015). To my knowledge,
this dissertation is the first to use longitudinal tiered provider network data from multiple insurers, and indeed among the first to use longitudinal data on any type of provider
13
For three of the insurers—Health New England, Neighborhood Health Plan, and UniCare—data on
narrow networks were supplemented with data collected by the GIC. I thank Cindy McGrath at the GIC
for sharing these data for previous years.
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network.
A map of Harvard Pilgrim’s and Tufts’ network tiers for 2012, the most recent year for which
claims data are available, is shown in Figure 1. Figure 7 in the appendix also shows the tiers
for Blue Cross Blue Shield, the state’s largest insurer, for comparison. All Massachusetts
hospitals are in-network for these tiered-network plans. Table 4 reports the distribution
of hospitals across tiers for 2012. The analysis will be restricted to the state’s 61 general
acute care hospitals, which have a total of 72 distinct campuses. Parts of the analysis
will be further restricted to the 17 hospital campuses in metropolitan Boston.14 In the
table, tier 1 denotes the most preferred tier with the lowest out-of-pocket price, and tier 3
the least preferred tier. The relative size of the tiers differs across insurers, and hospitals
belonging to the same system are not necessarily in the same tier within an insurer. There
is merger and acquisition activity within the time period covered by the tiering data, but
changes in ownership or system status do not seem to affect tier assignments (almost all
the acquired hospitals begin in the most preferred tier). Table 3 reports the distribution
of hospital characteristics across tiers. Hospitals in the least preferred tier, tier 3, are
disproportionately large. Academic medical centers (AMCs) are more commonly in tier 1
or tier 3 than in the middle tier. A non-negligible fraction of hospitals is found in each tier
in both the Boston area and less urban parts of Massachusetts.
The longitudinal nature of the data provides identifying variation for estimating demand
response to hospital out-of-pocket price. Hospitals’ tiers vary cross-sectionally across insurers and over time within an insurer. In addition, there is variation from differences in tier
copays across plans within an insurer-year. Table 5 shows the contemporaneous variation
in a hospital’s tier assignment across Harvard Pilgrim’s and Tufts’ tiered networks. Each
cell (i, j) in the table denotes the percentage of hospitals, among those in Harvard Pilgrim’s
row i tier, that are in Tufts’ column j tier in the same year. Although some hospitals
14
Satellite campuses of hospitals are excluded from these summary statistics, but enter into the demand
estimation as separate choice alternatives to account for the fact that their location and available services
can differ from the hospital’s primary campus.
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consistently occupy high or low tiers across insurers, half (49%) of hospitals are in different
tiers in Harvard Pilgrim’s and Tufts’ networks. Of those, a fifth (10% of the total) are in
tier 1 for one insurer and tier 3 for the other.
Hospitals also change tiers within an insurer’s network over time. By law, tier assignments
can change at most annually (Massachusetts, 2010). Table 6 shows the transition matrix of
hospitals’ tier placements over time within the same insurer’s network. Each cell (i, j) in
the table denotes the percentage of hospitals starting in the tier in row i in 2010 that have
moved to the tier in column j by 2014. Within an insurer over time, there is movement
of hospitals across tiers in both directions; this movement is typically not consistent across
insurers. Depending on the tier in the baseline year, 27-36% of hospitals in an insurer’s
tiered network are moved to a different tier by the end of the sample period. Of the hospitals
whose tier assignment changes, the majority move to an adjacent tier; that is, there is little
movement between tiers 1 and 3. Hospitals occasionally move out of and then back into
their initial tier during the sample period.
In addition to the variation in a hospital’s tier across insurers and over time, consumers’ outof-pocket costs for care from a given hospital can vary across plans within an insurer. For
example, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care’s family of tiered-network plans includes plans with
copays for tiers 1, 2, and 3 of $250, $500, and $750, respectively; and other plans with copays
of $300, $300, and $700. In both cases, the identity of hospitals in each tier is unchanged
within an insurer-year, but the associated copay structure can differ across plans. Larger
differences in out-of-pocket costs are also observed. Among high-enrollment products, the
largest differences are in Tufts Health Plan plans with copays of $250, $750, and $1,500
across hospitals in tiers 1, 2, and 3. The combination of cross-sectional variation in hospital
tiers across insurers, variation over time within an insurer, and variation in copays across
plans within an insurer-year provides helpful identifying variation for estimating hospital
demand. Table 7 summarizes the support of the distribution of copay spreads between tiers
1 and 3.
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The tiered network data are used to estimate hospital demand as a function of out-of-pocket
price. Clean identification of a price coefficient in hospital demand is typically impeded by
a lack of data on insurers’ provider network arrangements, especially retrospective data
that can be merged into data on medical care usage (Gaynor et al., 2015). I overcome this
identification challenge using my longitudinal tiered network data, which allow me to infer
consumers’ out-of-pocket prices for hospitals from which they are not observed to seek care.

1.6. Outline
The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 explores the demand-side
effects of tiered hospital networks. Section 2.1 describes a model of consumer demand for
hospitals under differential out-of-pocket pricing, and presents empirical results from the
estimation of this model. Section 2.2 builds on the hospital demand portion to construct
a model of household demand for health insurance plans as a function of premiums and
hospital networks, and presents related empirical results. Chapter 3 presents an explicit
bargaining model that describes the price-setting negotiations between insurers and hospitals. Section 3.7 then presents the results of the empirical application of the bargaining
model. The models and results from Chapters 2 and 3 are used in Chapter 4 to conduct
counterfactual analyses evaluating the aggregate effects of tiered networks on hospital utilization, prices, and spending. The empirical setting and data for all analyses are outlined
in Section 1.5 above. Implications of the findings are discussed in Section 5.
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1.7. Tables and Figures
Table 1: Characteristics of GIC health insurance enrollees
Individuals

Families

39.5
17.8
1
1
59.5
48.1
49
47.3
19.8
12.2
28.1
25.4
14.6

60.5
82.2
3
3.2
50.3
35.7
39
56.2
18.2
13.1
29.4
20
19.3

% of households
% of total enrollment
Median family size
Mean family size
% female
Mean age
Median age
% entering before 2009
% Western Mass.
% Central Mass.
% Northeast Mass.
% Metro Boston
% Southeast Mass.

Summary statistics for Massachusetts Group Insurance
Commission (GIC) health insurance enrollees. Column 1 is
single enrollees; column 2 is enrollees with dependents.
60% of enrolled households include dependents, who are
typically younger than primary enrollees. Approximately
half of households are enrolled in the GIC prior to the
start of the data in 2009.
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Table 2: Plans available on the GIC, fiscal year 2011
Plan
Fallon Direct
Fallon Select
Harvard Pilgrim Independence
Harvard Pilgrim Primary Choice
Health New England
Neighborhood Health Plan
Tufts Navigator
Tufts Spirit
UniCare Basic
UniCare Community Choice
UniCare PLUS

Tiered

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Network

Copays ($)

Indiv. Prem. ($)

Family Prem. ($)

Narrow
Inclusive
Inclusive
Narrow
Narrow
Narrow
Inclusive
Narrow
Inclusive
Inclusive
Inclusive

200
250
250/500/750
250/500/—
250
250
300/700/700
300/700/—
200
250/500/750
250

1, 265.16
1, 513.44
1, 829.52
1, 456.20
1, 262.52
1, 261.08
1, 760.16
1, 401.24
2, 765.52
1, 240.44
1, 703.52

3, 007.44
3, 603.48
4, 439.16
3, 527.40
3, 099.36
3, 307.92
4, 244.52
3, 372.96
6, 424.20
2, 948.16
4, 036.92
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GIC plans for fiscal year 2011 (July 2010–June 2011). Copays are for hospital inpatient services (across tiers
1/2/3). Premiums are the employee’s annual premium contribution, 25% of the total premium. Each plan has
two levels of premiums, one for individual and one for family coverage, that do not vary with age or geography.
Plan availability varies across counties and over time.

Figure 1: Massachusetts insurers’ hospital tiers (2012)
(a) Harvard Pilgrim

(b) Tufts

27

Maps of Harvard Pilgrim’s and Tufts’ tiered hospital networks in 2012. Each dot represents a general acute care hospital in Massachusetts. Contours
represent Massachusetts counties.All hospitals are included in both insurers’ tiered networks, but hospitals’ tiers are not necessarily consistent across
insurers.

Table 3: Hospital characteristics by tier, 2010-2014

Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
Count

% of All
Hospitals
51.6
23.9
24.5
61.0

Beds
(tier means)
240.9
286.7
318.2
53.0

% of System
Hospitals
41.1
22.2
36.7
31.0

% of AMCs
32.5
30.8
36.8
14.0

% of Boston
HRR Hospitals
54.7
22.5
22.8
41.0

% of Non-Boston
HRR Hospitals
44.1
26.8
29.1
20.0

Hospital characteristics weighted by tier frequency across insurers and years. Final row reports hospital counts.
Hospitals in the least preferred tier (tier 3) are larger and have a higher proportion of academic medical centers
(AMCs). Hospitals both in and outside of Boston are present in all three tiers.

Table 4: Distribution of hospitals across tiers, 2012
# of Hospitals in
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
Total

HPHC
28
20
13
61

Tufts
39
2
20
61

Counts of hospitals in each tier for a sample
year. HPHC is Harvard Pilgrim. Satellite
campuses are excluded.

Table 5: Hospital contemporaneous tier differences across insurers (%), 2011-2014
HPHC \Tufts
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3

Tier 1
81.0
67.0
23.1

Tier 2
5.0
9.6
7.7

Tier 3
14.0
23.4
69.2

Total
100.0
100.0
100.0

Percent of hospitals in row insurer’s tier that are
in column insurer’s tier in the same year. Satellite
campuses are excluded. Half of hospitals are in
different tiers across insurers.

Table 6: Hospital tier changes within insurers (%), 2010-2014
From\To
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3

Tier 1
68.2
31.8
3.0

Tier 2
25.8
63.6
24.2

Tier 3
6.1
4.5
72.7

Total
100.0
100.0
100.0

Percent of hospitals transitioning from row
tier in 2010 to column tier in 2014. Satellite
campuses are excluded. One quarter to one
third of hospitals in each tier change tiers
over time. Most movement is to adjacent tiers.
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Table 7: Copay spread between least and most preferred tiers
Spread ($)

Enrollment (%)

250
500
400
1, 000
1, 250

6.80
48.75
41.96
0.75
1.74

Enrollments reported as percent of total
enrollment in tiered plans in the data.
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CHAPTER 2 : Demand Response to Tiered Networks
Health insurance plan designs that use tiered hospital networks aim to inject price competition into the health care market by steering consumers toward lower-priced providers.
In a tiered network, hospitals are ranked by the insurer based on price and place them
into mutually exclusive groups, or tiers, that determine consumers’ out-of-pocket payment.
In contrast to traditional insurance plans, tiered networks vary consumers’ out-of-pocket
prices to reflect the variation in prices paid by insurers to providers.
The tiered hospital network plans that are the subject of this study combine differential out-of-pocket pricing with low information search costs for consumers. The state of
Massachusetts requires tiered-network plans to “clearly and conspicuously indicate” the
out-of-pocket price differences across tiers (Massachusetts, 2012b). Insurers provide this
information to enrollees as part of the schedule of benefits documentation for each plan.
At the insurer level, they also publish lists of hospitals and their network tiers each year,
which can be easily accessed through their websites for the current year. These lists include
each hospital’s tier, so consumers do not need to search for multiple providers’ network
status in order to comparison-shop. Moreover, the tiered network plans offered through
the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission use copays rather than coinsurance, so
that consumers observe the absolute dollar amount for their out-of-pocket price.15 This
represents an unusually high degree of ex ante price transparency for hospital care. In traditional plan designs, learning out-of-pocket prices of care in advance is very costly: even
savvy consumers who ask for price quotes are typically stymied (Bebinger, 2014). While
recent years have seen growth in high-deductible health plans and other insurance designs
that sensitize consumers to the price of care (KFF, 2014), health care prices remain largely
opaque and irrelevant to consumers at the point of service. Tiered networks therefore substantially reduce consumer search costs over price information relative to traditional plan
15

In general many health insurance plans use coinsurance, which is calculated as a percentage of the overall
hospital price. The hospital price, however, is at best imperfectly observable to consumers.

30

designs.
Advocates of tiered networks argue that they reduce health care spending by steering consumers toward lower-priced providers at the point of seeking care (Sinaiko, 2012). In addition, consumers may respond to network design ex ante, when they are enrolling in health
insurance plans. There are two keys margins on which health plan enrollment can respond:
valuation of plan hospital networks as a function of hospital tiers; and plan premiums, which
can change in response to negotiated prices and tiers. In this chapter, I evaluate the effects
of tiered networks on both hospital choice and plan enrollment by estimating discrete choice
models of consumer-level demand for hospitals and household-level demand for insurance
plans.

2.1. Demand for Hospitals
2.1.1. Hospital Demand Estimation
The market consists of consumers (patients) i, who belong to households ι ∈ I with one or
more members; insurers M ∈ M ; insurance plans m ∈ M; and hospitals h ∈ H. In the
last stage of the model, consumers’ health risk is realized: consumer i enrolled in plan m
becomes sick with diagnosis d ∈ D with probability fid , which is allowed to vary according
to consumer characteristics. (A list of the symbols used throughout the dissertation is
provided in the appendix on page 105.) The consumer must then choose a hospital for
treatment to maximize her utility, which depends on the consumer’s characteristics, the
hospital’s characteristics, and the out-of-pocket price for the hospital in the consumer’s
health plan. Conditional on being sufficiently ill to require inpatient hospital treatment,
patient i’s utility from seeking treatment at hospital h is given by

umhid = −αcmh + βxhid + εmhid

(2.1)

where cmh is the copay for treatment at hospital h under plan m; α is out-of-pocket price
sensitivity; xhid is a vector of patient, illness, and hospital characteristics and their interac31

tions, including hospital fixed effects; β is the associated coefficient vector; and εmhid is an
idiosyncratic error term that is i.i.d. type 1 extreme value. The key parameter of interest
is demand sensitivity to out-of-pocket price α.
Hospital demand is estimated on approximately 30,000 inpatient hospital admissions of
nonelderly, privately insured patients in Massachusetts between 2009 and 2012. These
include all observed admissions of GIC enrollees in four tiered and five non-tiered GIC
plans and an additional 8,000 admissions of patients in Harvard Pilgrim’s and Tufts’ tiered
plans offered outside the GIC. The non-GIC enrollees are included to provide additional
variation in hospital tier copays across plans. In addition, hospital demand is estimated on
a subset of approximately 6,000 inpatient admissions originating from the Greater Boston
area.

16

Among Boston area patients, 74% of admissions are to hospitals in metropolitan

Boston and an additional 25% are to hospitals in the Boston area. Among the subset of
Boston area patients residing in metropolitan Boston, 96% of admissions are to hospitals
in metropolitan Boston. I exclude claims for admissions originating from the emergency
department (ED) or via transfers from other hospitals, for two reasons. First, the notion
of patients’ hospital choice is of questionable validity for such hospitalizations. Second,
Massachusetts legislation requires care originating in the ED to be covered at the lowest
patient out-of-pocket price regardless of provider tier (Massachusetts, 2010).
Patient and hospital characteristics in xhid include patient demographics, diagnosis category,
hospital characteristics, and distance. Distance to a hospital has been found to be an
important determinant of hospital choice (Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Town and Vistnes,
2001; Capps et al., 2003). The demand model uses driving distance from the centroid of the
patient’s zip code to the hospital’s street address and the square of the distance, calculated
using Bing Maps driving directions. Patient demographics such as age and gender are also
included. Hospital characteristics include teaching status, number of beds, an indicator
for whether the hospital is a secondary satellite campus, and hospital quality. Hospital
16

The Greater Boston area county attributions are taken from the Massachusetts Executive Office of
Housing and Economic Development.
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quality is measured as perceived by patients using measures from the Hospital Consumer
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS).17 In contrast to previous
work on hospital choice, the inclusion of quality measures allows less of the heterogeneity
in hospital preferences to be loaded onto hospital fixed effects. Summary statistics for the
admissions included in the hospital demand model are shown in Table 8.
Diagnoses are grouped into diagnostic categories using the Clinical Classifications Software
(CCS) developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ, 2015). The
CCS classification system assigns diagnosis codes to approximately 300 mutually exclusive
diagnosis groups, which are further aggregated into eighteen broad diagnostic categories.
The CCS diagnostic categories are described and their prevalence in the Massachusetts
nonelderly population given in Table 10. The model includes interaction terms for CCS
categories and indicators for the presence of related services at each hospital, drawn from
the American Hospital Association Annual Survey of Hospitals. In particular, the demand
estimation includes: cardiac CCS interacted with hospital catheterization lab; obstetric
CCS interacted with neonatal intensive care unit; nervous, circulatory, and musculoskeletal
CCS interacted with MRI; and nervous system CCS interacted with neurological services.
These interactions allow hospital choice to vary according to whether specialized services
relating to the patient’s diagnosis are available at the hospital.
This parameterization of hospital choice has several implications. The multinomial logit
structure implies the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property of demand,
which I mitigate by including detailed data at the consumer-hospital level, such as driving
distance and interactions between diagnosis and hospital facilities. The model also treats
choice of hospital as a composite measure of the patient’s preferences and other factors.
In general, a patient’s choice of hospital can be mediated by unobserved factors, notably
referrals by the patient’s physician (Kolstad and Chernew, 2009; Ho and Pakes, 2013). In
17

The HCAHPS is a third-party national survey of patients that asks about their hospital experience,
including responsiveness of medical staff, cleanliness, pain control, and overall rating (CMS, 2014b). The
HCAHPS scores capture patients’ perceptions of hospital quality and are highly correlated with other hospital
reputation measures such as U.S. News rankings.
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this dissertation, the goal is to estimate the effect of tiered networks on actual market
outcomes that may include physician referrals, so I treat the observed choice of hospital as
the quantity of interest irrespective of the physician’s influence on the decision. If hospital
choices are subject to unobserved influences not related to price, this will bias my estimate
of out-of-pocket price sensitivity toward the null.
Conditional on a diagnosis and insurance plan structure, consumers choose a hospital to
maximize utility as a function of all the choice variables just described. Because the error
εmhid is assumed i.i.d. type 1 extreme value, the consumer’s probability σmhid of choosing
hospital h under plan m and diagnosis d then becomes

σmhid = P

exp (−αcmh + βxhid )
.
exp (−αcmh0 + βxh0 id )

(2.2)

h0 ∈H

In this set-up, patients will value more highly those network arrangements that set low
out-of-pocket prices cmh for nearby, high-quality, or otherwise desirable hospitals.
Consumer valuation of a hospital network is measured by willingness-to-pay (WTP). An
individual consumer’s ex ante dollarized valuation of plan m’s tiered hospital network is the
expected utility of seeking care at various hospitals at the out-of-pocket prices dictated by
the tiers in m:



Wmi



X
1 X
fid ln 
exp (−αcmh + βxhid ) .
=
α d∈D
h∈H

(2.3)

This expression is the familiar log-sum equation for expected consumer surplus for a logit
model, modified in that an additional expectation is taken over the probability of consuming
any care, expressed in fid . This modification gives rise to the willingness-to-pay for a
hospital network as defined in Capps et al. (2003), here with the additional complication
that networks can vary in out-of-pocket prices across hospitals. The availability of a direct
estimate of the price responsiveness parameter α allows the WTP to be expressed in dollars,
rather than in utils as is the case in settings that lack out-of-pocket price variation. The
identification of Wmi within versus across consumers is discussed in the appendix (page
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107).
The calculation of WTP requires each consumer’s ex ante distribution of diagnosis probabilities fid for the upcoming year. I calculate these probabilities separately for each sex–10year age band cell and each CCS diagnostic category using data on all non-transfer hospital
admissions of Massachusetts residents from the 2010 HCUP State Inpatient Database.18
Since patient covariates such as distance to hospitals also vary across zip codes, WTP for a
given hospital network takes on a separate value for each gender-age group-zip code triplet.
Allowing for this granular variation in consumers’ preferences and admission probabilities
at the diagnostic category level allows the WTP measure to capture rich variation across
consumers.
2.1.2. Identification of Hospital Demand
Identification of preference parameters in the hospital choice model relies on cross-sectional
and longitudinal variation in hospital networks in addition to differences in hospital and
patient characteristics. The model includes hospital fixed effects, so identification comes
from within-hospital variation across plans, patients, and years. For example, distance to
the hospital and interactions of diagnosis with hospital characteristics vary across admissions
by patient address and clinical characteristics. Hospital choice sets vary across plans, with
some providing their enrollees access to all hospitals in the state and others using narrow
networks.
Identifying variation for the coefficient of interest on out-of-pocket price comes from three
sources that leverage the tiered hospital networks in the data. Hospitals move across tiers
within insurers’ networks over the course of the sample period (Table 6), generating a
18

This is equivalent to the assumption that that a consumer’s expectation of her health status for the
upcoming year is a consistent predictor of her health status, given only her sex, her 10-year age group, and
the fact of residing in Massachusetts. This assumption is more likely to hold for relatively healthy consumers
who do not have highly informative personal experience to inform their ex ante expectations of diagnosis
(Shepard, 2014). Since my data consist of non-elderly, commercially insured, mostly employed individuals,
they are healthier than the general population and good candidates for the assumption that their expected
health status is approximately equal to the average health status for their age group. To the extent that
there are deviations from the average health status, they will load onto the error term in the plan choice
model.
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change of $200 to $1,500 in out-of-pocket price depending on the plan. Hospitals with
higher negotiated prices are generally in less preferred tiers with higher out-of-pocket price.
Table 9 reports mean negotiated prices for the hospitals in each tier, as a multiple of the
mean price for hospitals in the most preferred tier (tier 1),19 and the copays for those
tiers in the respective insurers’ largest tiered plans. In addition, within a year, there is
substantial variation in out-of-pocket price arrangements across plans in the sample: copays
for hospitals in tiers 1/2/3 range from $200/$400/$400 to $250/$750/$1,500. Finally, a
hospital’s tier assignment can vary contemporaneously across insurers (Table 5), which
provides an important source of within-year identifying variation.
Hospital copays may be endogenous to hospital choice if consumers select into plans based
on the network status of their preferred hospitals. If consumers are taking their preferences over hospitals into account when choosing a health insurance plan, then the copay
arrangements of the plans into which they sort will not be exogenous. Indeed, empirical
evidence suggests that plan choice and subsequent choice of provider can be correlated,
at least among consumers with established relationships with their health care providers
(Shepard, 2014). In my setting, for example, a consumer who places high value on receiving
treatment at Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) for unobservable reasons such as a
strong preference for academic medical centers may also choose plans that include MGH in
the network at a low out-of-pocket price. The copays faced by consumers in the hospital
demand stage, cmh , may therefore be correlated with the error term εmhid , leading to a
biased estimate of the price sensitivity coefficient. The primary concern is that consumers
sort into plans based on which networks include their preferred hospitals at the lowest outof-pocket price. If this is the case, then the estimate of consumers’ price sensitivity will be
biased away from the null, in the direction of a more negative coefficient than the true price
sensitivity.
To address the potential endogeneity from correlated plan and hospital choices, I lever19

Privacy considerations in the data use agreement preclude the reporting of dollar amounts for negotiated
prices.
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age consumers’ high level of inertia in plan choices. Intuitively, the identification strategy
uses enrollees’ past plan choices to deal with endogeneity in current plan characteristics.
The identifying assumption is that conditional on current plan copays cmh and preferences
over hospitals captured by xhid , consumers do not anticipate a plan’s future changes to the
network or copay structure in period t + 1 when choosing a plan for the current enrollment period t. When consumers first enroll in insurance through the GIC, they are in an
active-choice setting and may consider their valuation of each plan’s hospital network and
other plan characteristics in choosing a plan. In subsequent enrollment periods, although
premiums and plan characteristics change, many consumers remain in the same plan without conducting a full reevaluation of their choice sets. Over time, therefore, an inertial
consumer’s plan characteristics increasingly approximate random assignment. I leverage
this inertia by using the previous year’s copay in the consumer’s plan to deal with the
endogeneity in that plan’s current copay.20 The identifying assumption would be violated
if, for example, consumers are aware that the insurer intends to raise copays in the next
enrollment year at the time that they purchase this year’s coverage, a year in advance of the
publication of next year’s plan benefits descriptions. An analogous approach is employed
by Abaluck et al. (2015) in the context of pharmaceutical coverage choice among seniors.
The use of previous plan choices to generate plausibly exogenous variation in current plan
copays is only justified if there is, indeed, a high degree of inertia in plan choice. The
fraction of consumers enrolled in each GIC plan in enrollment year 2010 who continued to
be enrolled in the same plan in 2011 is reported in Table 11.21 Despite the introduction of
two new plans in 2011, 92% of 2010 enrollees remain in the same plan in 2011. In another
stark example, in enrollment year 2010, the Harvard Pilgrim Independence Plan switched
from a standard hospital network with flat $300 copays to a tiered hospital network for the
first time. The new tiered network uses three hospital tiers with copays of $250, $500, and
20

I use the previous year’s copay rather than the copay in the consumer’s first year of enrollment in order
to avoid losing a large portion of the sample when consumers have been enrolled since before the start of
the data.
21
The GIC’s enrollment periods coincide with its fiscal years, which begin on July 1 and end on June 30
of the following calendar year.
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$750 (Table 2). In spite of this substantial network change, at least 90% of those enrolled
in the Harvard Pilgrim plan in enrollment year 2009, immediately prior to the introduction
of hospital tiering, were still enrolled in the plan in 2010. These patterns are consistent
with findings from the plan choice literature showing that consumers fail to re-optimize
their plan choices over time, even as plan characteristics change (Handel, 2013; Ericson,
2014; Shepard, 2014). Combined with these findings, the very high degree of inertia in this
dataset motivates the identification strategy.
Since hospital choice is not linear in the endogenous variable (copay), the standard IV approach of substituting predicted values of the endogenous regressor into the second-stage
equation would produce biased estimates (Terza et al., 2008). Instead, I employ a control
function approach to deal with the endogeneity. The control function corrects for the correlation between copays cmh and the error term εmhid by approximating the component
of the error that is correlated with copays and including it as a separate regressor (Petrin
and Train, 2010). In practice, the endogenous variable is regressed on the exogenous variables and the “instrument”, and the residuals from this first-stage regression enter into the
nonlinear second-stage model. This approach requires an exclusion restriction analogous to
standard IV methods, namely, that the “instrument” affects hospital choice only through
its effect on copay. If the assumptions are satisfied, then there exists some function of the
first-stage residuals that produces a consistent estimate of the coefficient on the endogenous
variable (Wooldridge, 2010). Because the true functional form required for consistency is
unknown, I allow the first-stage residuals to enter flexibly into the hospital choice model
using up to a fifth-degree polynomial expansion.22 The high degree of plan choice inertia in
the data, along with the use of a control function, allow me to obtain a consistent estimate
of price sensitivity in a nonlinear and potentially endogenous hospital choice setting.
22
Some papers have used two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI), where the residuals are entered into the second stage linearly (see, for example, Terza et al. (2008)). However, the consistency result for control functions
does not generally hold without a flexible specification for the residuals in the second stage (Wooldridge,
2010).
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2.1.3. Hospital Demand Results
Estimates from the multinomial logit hospital choice model are shown in Table 12. The
first column presents estimates from a sample including all general acute care hospitals
in Massachusetts and consumers residing anywhere in the state. The second column uses
a subsample of hospitals in metropolitan Boston and consumers residing in the Greater
Boston area. Consistent with the literature on hospital choice, the coefficient on distance is
negative and significant, implying that consumers are more likely to go to a hospital that
is close by (Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Town and Vistnes, 2001; Capps et al., 2003; Ho,
2006). Patients with cardiac or obstetric diagnoses are more likely to choose a hospital with
a catheterization lab or a NICU, respectively. Older patients and patients with chronic
conditions are more willing to travel to their chosen hospital. Hospital fixed effects also
display a sensible pattern (not shown). The most prestigious hospitals in the state, such as
Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) and Brigham and Women’s Hospital, have among
the largest estimated fixed effects, driven by their large share of patients from across the
state and across diagnoses despite their high out-of-pocket prices.
The primary coefficient of interest is the coefficient on out-of-pocket price, specifically copays
in this context. The negative and significant coefficient on price indicates that consumers
do, indeed, respond to differences in out-of-pocket price when choosing hospitals. The raw
coefficients are broadly consistent with the emerging evidence on patient hospital choice under differential out-of-pocket pricing (Scanlon et al., 2008; Frank et al., 2015; Gowrisankaran
et al., 2015). The larger ratio of the copay–to–distance coefficients in the Boston sample
suggests that consumers in Boston are more responsive to differential out-of-pocket prices
than is the average Massachusetts consumer. However, since the hospital demand is estimated as a multinomial logit discrete choice model, the elasticities implied by the model
are a more useful quantity for interpretation than are these raw coefficients. The elasticities
are reported in Tables 13 and 14 and are discussed below.
The hospital demand model is robust to a number of alternative specifications. Estimates
39

are stable when I allow price sensitivity to vary by income, as measured by the primary
enrollee’s zip code’s income quintile (Table 24 in the appendix). Point estimates for price
sensitivity are larger in magnitude for lower income quintiles, indicating that lower-income
consumers may be more price-sensitive. Taken at face value, these results would suggest that
the negative effect of price on demand is somewhat moderated for higher-income consumers,
which is consistent with decreasing marginal returns over wealth or liquidity-constrained
consumers. However, the differences in the price sensitivity coefficient across income groups
are not statistically significant.
Furthermore, I do not find evidence that the estimates are biased by consumers sorting
into plans that include their unobservably preferred hospitals at low out-of-pocket prices.
Tables 25 and 26 in the appendix shows the results of the control function estimation model
described in Section 2.1.2, using the previous year’s copays to instrument for the current
copays. If consumers were selecting into plans based on their unobserved preference for their
preferred hospitals to be available at a low out-of-pocket price in the plan’s network, then
failing to account for this endogeneity would bias the price sensitivity coefficient away from
the null. Instead, the control function estimates are consistent with the uninstrumented
estimates.23 My preferred specification for hospital demand is therefore the conservative
and parsimonious model presented in Table 12.
The hospital price elasticities implied by the demand model are summarized in Table 13 for
the full Massachusetts sample, and Table 14 for the Boston sample. The first two rows of
each table show hospitals’ own-price elasticities with respect to out-of-pocket prices at each
hospital’s observed mean tiered copay and a fixed $1,000 copay, respectively. Estimates for
the own-price elasticity of demand range from −0.02 to −0.24 for the full Massachusetts
sample, and −0.27 to −0.97 for the Boston sample. The density of hospitals in the Boston
area is substantially higher than in the rest of the state, allowing consumers to more easily
23
If anything, estimates with higher-degree polynomials in the control function (degree 3 and higher,
columns on the right of the table) suggest that the uninstrumented model may be underestimating the
degree of price sensitivity. This is the opposite of what would be expected in the case of endogeneity due to
consumer sorting into plans with low copays for their preferred hospitals.
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substitute across hospitals in response to copay differences (Figure 1). Consumers in Boston
may also have higher levels of health literacy, which is positively correlated with education
and which would signify that these consumers have a better understanding of tiered hospital
networks and more agency over their health care consumption decisions (Kutner et al.,
2006). In the statewide sample at $1,000 copays, the bulk of the elasticity distribution is
comparable to the RAND Health Insurance Experiment estimate of approximately −0.2,
where the maximum out-of-pocket price was $1,000 in 1980s dollars (Manning et al., 1987).
However, in the RAND study, elasticities were estimated on the extensive margin of seeking
care. My results suggest that demand is also price-responsive on the intensive margin
of choosing between options conditional on seeking care in the first place, especially in
dense urban areas such as Boston. This provides evidence for the importance of price
transparency to controlling moral hazard on the intensive margin as well as the betterstudied extensive margin (Pauly, 1968). These estimates are comparable to those estimated
by Gowrisankaran et al. (2015), who find own-price elasticities of −0.10 to −0.15. The larger
magnitudes in my context may be driven by the fact that consumers can perfectly observe
copays ex ante; whereas in Gowrisankaran et al. (2015), out-of-pocket price is determined
by coinsurance, which is calculated as a percentage of the overall hospital price that is at
best imperfectly observable to consumers. While demand is somewhat responsive to price,
the low magnitude of the elasticity estimates in the statewide analyses indicates that out-ofpocket price differences across tiers must be large in order to appreciably change consumer
behavior outside of Boston.
Tables 13 and 14 also report hospitals’ pairwise cross-price elasticities. They range from
essentially zero to approximately 0.21. The many hospital pairs with negligible cross-price
elasticities increase confidence in my approach to reducing dimensionality in the bargaining
model by allowing firms to focus primarily on the hospital’s closest competitors in price
negotiations (Section 3.6). Hospital pairs that are geographically close have high crossprice elasticities, indicating that they are good substitutes for one another. The statewide
results indicate that many hospitals, including those far from Boston, have a high cross-price
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elasticity with respect to the top Boston academic medical centers, Brigham and Women’s
Hospital and Massachusetts General Hospital. That is, the model predicts that patients
substituting away from a given hospital are likely to substitute either to its geographic
competitors or to the top hospitals, irrespective of geographic proximity. This accords with
intuition and with findings that such “star” hospitals are disproportionately attractive to
patients (Ho, 2009; Shepard, 2014). Furthermore, the cross-price elasticity estimates suggest
that these top hospitals, along with other academic medical centers such as Beth Israel
Deaconess Medical Center and Tufts Medical Center, are each other’s closest substitutes.
These predicted substitution patterns suggest that I am capturing real patterns in how
patients choose hospitals.
2.1.4. Willingness to Pay for Hospital Networks
I now turn to the willingness to pay (WTP) for hospital networks implied by the hospital demand estimates, which enters consumers’ utility from an insurance plan’s hospital
network. For a given plan, a household’s WTP for the hospital network is defined as the
dollarized expected utility of the hospitals, given the household members’ risk of diagnosis
and the utility from hospitals implied by the hospital demand model (Equation 2.3). Figure 2a is an illustrative map showing the geographic variation in WTP using the demand
estimates from the statewide sample. The figure plots the median annual WTP by county,
in dollars, for the Harvard Pilgrim Independence hospital network in fiscal year 2011. The
plan’s network includes all hospitals in the state and uses tier copays of $250, $500, and
$750, respectively, for hospitals in tiers 1, 2, and 3. The geographic variation in WTP is
driven by the fact that some consumers are geographically closer to a larger number of hospitals or more desirable hospitals. This is apparent in the case of the Boston area, visible
on the map as the dense cluster of hospitals on the eastern coast of the state. Consumers
living in Central and Western Massachusetts who live far from the top hospitals, and in
some cases far from any hospital, have a high disutility of distance in the hospital demand
model, which implies a low WTP for the hospital network. The geographic gradient of
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WTP for other broad-network plans’ hospital networks follows a similar pattern.24 Using a
more reduced-form approach to measuring WTP, Ericson and Starc (2014) also find large
geographic heterogeneity in WTP for hospital networks in Massachusetts. Their estimates
suggest that WTP is substantially higher among residents of the Boston area than those
in Springfield (Western Massachusetts) or Worcester (Central Massachusetts), with the geographic variation being comparable to moving a plan’s actuarial value from 100% to 0%.
These findings, which use a different approach to calculating WTP from this dissertation,
increase confidence in my estimates of geographic variation in WTP.
Figure 2a obscures the non-geographic differences in WTP driven by household size and
age-sex composition (appendix Table 27). For adult men in a given geographic area, WTP
for the network is monotonically increasing with age. This is driven by the increasing
probability of hospital admission as men get older. For adult women, the pattern is similar
except for a temporary rise in WTP for women in their 20s and 30s, which is driven by birthrelated admissions. Once a woman is past childbearing age, her admission probabilities once
again become comparable to those of men in the same age group. Larger households have
correspondingly higher WTP.
Figure 2b shows differences in WTP across plans within households.25 The figure plots the
distribution of the difference in annual WTP, in dollars, between a household’s observed
chosen plan and all other plans. Enrollees in the two largest plans in the GIC are plotted
separately from other enrollees. For all plans, the bulk of the distribution is to the right of
zero, indicating that for most enrollees, their chosen plan’s WTP is greater than the mean
WTP of other available plans. This figure provides suggestive evidence that consumers
value hospital networks for which they have high predicted WTP when choosing plans.
Much of this variation is driven by large differences in WTP across narrow-network plans
and plans including all hospitals in their network, but there is some variation based on
24
This plot assumes that the differences in coefficient of integration in WTP across households is small in
comparison to the primary component of WTP (see discussion in the appendix on page 107).
25
Comparing WTP within households relaxes the assumption made in interpreting Figure 2a that level
shifts in utility across households are small (see discussion in the appendix on page 107).
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hospital tiers as well. Similar patterns are observed for households with more than one
member. These stylized observations motivate the estimation of plan demand in Section
2.2.3. The median difference between the highest and lowest network WTP in a plan choice
set is $847 for single-person households and $1,684 for multi-person households; the 75th
percentile is $2,057 and $4,711, respectively. The substantial variation in WTP across plan
networks within a household suggests that WTP for networks could play an important role
in plan preferences. By comparison, total employee and employer contributions to premiums
on the GIC range from about $4,000 to $9,000. The rich variation across geographic and
demographic household characteristics that is captured by the WTP measure is used to
identify the coefficient on hospital network valuation in the plan demand model, to which
I now turn.

2.2. Demand for Health Insurance Plans
2.2.1. Plan Demand Estimation
In stage 2, households choose a health insurance plan given the household members’ expected hospital choices in stage 3. Plan choice is estimated at the level of the household,
where each household ι includes the primary plan policy holder and may additionally include other household members. Premiums and willingness to pay for the hospital network
are calculated therefore for all spouses and dependents as well as the household’s primary
enrollee. The choice between purchasing individual insurance or family insurance is taken
as given. To my knowledge, only Ho and Lee (2015) have jointly estimated provider choice
and plan choice with the household, rather than the individual, as the unit of observation
in the plan demand model.
Plan choice depends on the household’s total WTP for the hospital network Wmι , insurance
premium rmι , and other plan attributes Xm . Each household must choose a health insurance
plan before household members’ health risk for the entire enrollment period is realized.
Therefore, at the time of enrollment, the household projects the expected utility from each
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plan’s network to choose a utility-maximizing plan. Household ι’s expected utility Umι from
enrolling in plan m is given by

Umι = −δ1 rmι + δ2 Wmι + γXm + ζmι

where Wmι =

P

i∈ι Wmi

(2.4)

is the household’s dollarized expected utility from using the hos-

pitals in plan m; rmι is the premium for plan m (which is a function of the family size of
household ι); δ1 , δ2 are premium and WTP sensitivities, respectively; Xm is a vector of the
plan’s non-hospital care attributes and plan fixed effects, and γ the associated coefficient;
and ζmι is an i.i.d. type 1 extreme value error term. For households with more than one
member, Wmi is added up across all household members i and the plan premium rmι reflects
family coverage premium levels.26
The introduction of the plan’s non–hospital-related characteristics Xm is a recent addition to
the literature on insurer-hospital bargaining and plan choice.27 Detailed plan characteristics
such as deductible levels and out-of-pocket prices are typically not observable in claims
datasets, and are not included in the Massachusetts APCD. However, in the GIC plan
benefits documentation, I observe longitudinal information on plan characteristics. The
plan demand model includes an indicator whether the plan uses a tiered or narrow physician
network; and copay levels for primary care visits, specialist physician visits, and mental
health care. Deductibles are observed but excluded from the plan choice model because they
do not vary across plans within an enrollment period. To my knowledge, this dissertation is
the first to estimate plan demand allowing a dollarized measure network valuation to enter
into plan utility, and using detailed plan financial characteristics. Accounting for both types
26

A list of the symbols used throughout the dissertation is provided in the appendix (page 105).
Ericson and Starc (2014) include plans’ actuarial values in their plan choice models, but earlier papers
typically do not have access to claims data and so cannot explicitly account for a plan’s generosity. For many
of these papers, this data limitation was not central to the analysis, since they do not rely on estimates of
plan choice models for their results. An exception is Ho (2009), who estimates aggregate plan shares and
includes plan quality measures, which capture a dimension similar to plan generosity. For the purposes of
this analysis, it is important to account for the non-hospital attributes of a plan, since plan choice is being
estimated directly. Using only the value of the hospital network Wmι less the premium would load all other
differences across plans into the error term ζmι , which would likely lead to endogeneity.
27
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of arguments in plan demand allows a comparison of consumers’ relative valuation of various
plan characteristics in choosing plans.
Given parameterizations of umhid and Umι , households choose a plan m ∈ M to maximize
Umι before household members’ health risk is realized. The type 1 extreme value distribution
of ζmι yields the familiar probability of choosing plan m
exp (−δ1 rmι + δ2 Wmι + γXm )
.
m0 =1 exp (−δ1 rm0 ι + δ2 Wm0 ι + γXm0 )

smι = PM

I use the subset of consumers who purchase their coverage through the Group Insurance
Commission (GIC) to estimate the plan demand model in order to construct well-specified
choice sets. Reconstructing plan choice sets directly from the claims data is unreliable at
best, as they do not include employer or group identifiers, and lack information on premiums
and plan characteristics. One of the six insurers participating on the GIC is missing from
the claims data: UniCare, which has a 32% market share on the GIC across three plans. I
therefore estimate plan demand on those GIC enrollees who are enrolled in a plan offered by
one of the other five insurers in the data. For these enrollees, the outside option is assumed
to be one of UniCare’s three GIC plans. Although these plan records are missing from the
claims data, I can include their counterfactual utility, because I observe their premiums
and total enrollment in GIC publications. Enrollment in the GIC plans is summarized in
Table 23 in the appendix. The assumption required in order to generalize plan demand
estimates from the GIC market to the rest of the Massachusetts commercial market is that
conditional on the choice set, employment in a state or municipal agency is orthogonal to
plan preferences. In the counterfactual exercise, I remain agnostic about this assumption
by holding non-GIC plan enrollments fixed as negotiated prices change.
Demand for plans is estimated on a subset of households, using only those for which plan
choice sets and characteristics are observed because they purchase health insurance through
the GIC. To deal with the high inertia in plan choices, I estimate plan choice using two key
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specifications. In the first, plan choice is estimated for the subset GIC enrollees who make
an active choice, defined as those who are observed in the GIC market for the first time. In
the second specification, active-choice and potentially inertial enrollees are both included,
and the model also includes an indicator for the enrollee’s current plan. This indicator is a
reduced-form summary measure capturing both consumer inattention and switching costs,
and is akin to the specification used by Shepard (2014). The longitudinal nature of the
enrollment data is key to defining the samples and the inertia indicator for both approaches
to dealing with inertia. In the counterfactual analyses, a restriction of the sample to firsttime enrollees is equivalent to conducting medium-run counterfactuals where enrollment is
allowed to fully adjust to the sizable shocks explored in the counterfactual scenarios.
Table 23 in the appendix shows the number of first-time GIC policy holders (primary enrollees) and their dependents enrolling in each plan over the relevant sample period. There
are approximately 36,000 new primary enrollees making an active choice of health plan
prior to July 2011. In July 2011, the GIC implemented an incentive program to encourage
employees to enroll in narrow-network plans. Employees were eligible for a premium discount if they enrolled in a narrow-network plan, with the size of the discount determined
by employee type and tenure (Gruber and McKnight, 2014). Since I do not observe employee types in the claims data, I further restrict the sample to plan choices made before
the premium discount in order to eliminate measurement error in premiums. Due to the
dimensionality of the data required to compute network WTP for each household,28 the
statewide model is estimated on a 3% sample of households enrolling in a GIC plan for
the first time in fiscal years 2009–2011, for a total of 1,217 households. The Boston plan
demand model, which is restricted to households all of whose members reside in Greater
Boston, is estimated on a 5% sample of first-time and re-enrolling households in fiscal years
2009–2011, for a total of 2,370 household-year pairs.
28

Each individual-diagnosis-hospital-plan combination requires a separate observation.
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2.2.2. Identification of Plan Demand
Identifying variation for the plan demand model comes from several sources. The menu
of plans available to consumers on the GIC varies across the state’s fourteen counties as
well as over time, including the entry of two new plans in July 2010. Plan characteristics,
such as copay levels and hospital networks, also change over time. Premiums are set for
the entire state for each fiscal year. These institutional features of the GIC market provide
plausibly exogenous variation in plan premiums.
Premiums vary nonlinearly with respect to family size: there is a discontinuous jump in
moving from individual coverage to coverage with a dependent, but premiums do not increase further as family size gets larger than two. Figure 3 shows an example of the nonlinear
variation in total family premium and per-person premium as family size increases. This
type of variation is analogous to the discontinuous increase in premiums as a function of
age leveraged by Ericson and Starc (2015). Moreover, the ratio of the family premium to
the individual premium is plausibly exogenous, since a uniform ratio is set by the GIC’s
actuaries for all GIC plans. Family premiums are approximately 2.4 times the same plan’s
individual premium throughout my sample period. Similarly, premium differences between
an insurer’s full-network plan and the same insurer’s narrow-network plan, when both are
offered on the GIC, are 1.25 across insurers and years. These ratios are chosen by the GIC
to maintain a consistent difference between family and individual coverage across plans
in the interest of fairness to employees, and to encourage employees to enroll in narrownetwork plans, respectively. In other words, they are not designed to accurately reflect cost
differences across plan populations and household sizes.
The household-level WTP measure varies by family size and the age, sex, and zip code of residence of the household members (appendix Table 27). Unlike premiums, WTP increases
linearly in family size conditional on household member characteristics. This difference
in the margins over which premiums and WTP vary helps to identify the model. Older
household members contribute larger WTPs due to their higher probabilities of hospital
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admission.29 For two individuals of the same sex and age but residing in different parts of
Massachusetts, variation in WTP comes from the fact that some consumers are geographically closer to a larger number of hospitals or more desirable hospitals (Figure 2a).
2.2.3. Plan Demand Results
Estimates of the multinomial logit plan demand model are reported in Table 15 for the
statewide sample, and Table 16 for the Boston sample. I use the hospital network WTP
calculated in Section 2.1.4 along with longitudinal data on plan availability in each county,
individual and family plan premiums, and other plan characteristics from the GIC plan data
(see Section 1.5.2) to estimate the plan demand model. As indicated by the positive and
significant coefficient on hospital network WTP in both the statewide and Boston samples,
consumers prefer plans whose hospital networks they value more highly. Ericson and Starc
(2014) also find that plan choice is highly responsive to network breadth, but there is no
existing evidence on the responsiveness of plan choice to hospitals’ tiers within an inclusive
network.
The premium variable is the household’s out-of-pocket premium contribution, which varies
across plans, years, and individual versus family coverage. The negative and significant
coefficient on premiums suggests that consumers dislike high premiums. The coefficient on
premiums is noisy in the statewide sample that includes plan fixed effects, likely due to
noise from measurement error on the portion of the premium paid by the employee.30 In
specifications with an interaction between premium and household income, price sensitivity
is muted by high income (Table 15). The preferred specification for the statewide sample,
reported in the second column of Table 15, includes network WTP and plan fixed effects
in addition to premiums and other plan characteristics that vary across plans. Plan characteristics that do not vary within plans over time are excluded; this variation is soaked
29
An exception to the overall monotonically increasing relationship between age and WTP is women of
prime childbearing age, who are admitted at higher rates than women younger than 20 and older than 40.
30
Some municipalities and other agencies whose employees purchase insurance through the GIC but which
are not direct state government employers may charge their employees a portion of the premium different
from the standard 20% charged to state employees, and this distinction is not observed in the data.
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up in the plan fixed effects. In the Boston sample, plan fixed effects are excluded due to
insufficient variation in plan choice sets, which are determined by county (Table 16). The
model for the Boston sample is saturated with all available plan characteristics that vary
contemporaneously across plans.
The Boston sample regressions demonstrate the importance of accounting for inertia in plan
enrollments (Table 16). The first column is subsetted to only first-time enrollees making
an active choice of plans. In the second column, re-enrolling households are also included,
but their enrollment persistence is ignored. This failure to account for inertia produces a
positive and significant coefficient on premiums, which would imply that consumers like
higher premiums. The third column takes inertia into account for this sample by adding an
indicator for the household’s plan in the previous plan year, which returns the coefficient
estimates to values that are very similar to those estimated from the active choice sample in
the first column, including a negative and significant coefficient on premiums. The coefficient
on the previous year’s plan indicator is positive and, at approximately twice the value of
the coefficient on WTP, implies that search frictions and switching costs are equivalent to
approximately $2,000 worth of network WTP.
The similar magnitude of the coefficients on premiums and WTP in the statewide sample,
taken at face value, would suggest that consumers trade off a dollar of premiums and a
dollar of WTP roughly equally (Table 15). In the Boston sample, the magnitude of the
WTP coefficient is approximately five times that of the premiums coefficient, which represents substantially greater responsiveness to network generosity among Boston consumers
than for the average Massachusetts consumer (Table 16). For Boston consumers, the WTP
measure is disproportionately affected by the generosity of coverage for the flagship Harvard academic medical centers. This finding is therefore consistent with results in Shepard
(2014) suggesting that network generosity, as measured by the inclusion of these star hospitals, is an important driver of plan enrollments for consumers who are likely to use them.
To my knowledge, the results in Tables 15 and 16 are the first estimates of consumer prefer-
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ences over a dollarized measure of WTP, allowing apples-to-apples comparisons of network
valuation and other financial characteristics of plans.31
Own-price elasticities of demand with respect to employee premium contributions are reported in Table 17. The first two columns report elasticities among active choice enrollees
in the full Massachusetts sample. The last two columns report elasticities among both
first-time and re-enrolling enrollees in the Boston sample (the Health New England plan is
not offered in the Boston area counties). The presence of inertial consumers in the Boston
sample leads to smaller for the highest-enrollment plans, Harvard Pilgrim Independence
and Tufts Navigator. Plan demand elasticities for high-enrollment plans are in the −0.4 to
−0.6 range for individual coverage in the statewide active choice sample, and in the −0.1
to −0.2 in the partially inertial Boston sample. For family coverage, which has premiums
2.4 times those for individual coverage (see Table 2), the bulk of the elasticities are in −1.0
to −1.5 range in the statewide sample and the −0.3 to −2.0 range in the Boston sample.
These elasticities are in line with previous estimates from the literature. Cutler and Reber
(1998) and Royalty and Solomon (1999) find elasticities of −1 and in the range of −0.2 to
−0.8, respectively, with respect to employees’ out-of-pocket premium contributions. Ho and
Lee (2015) find elasticities of −1.2 to −1.6 for individual coverage with respect to the total
employee and employer premium contribution, which are similar in magnitude to the employee contribution for family premiums in my data on which I find comparable elasticities.
The point estimates suggest that consumers respond to premiums when choosing health
insurance plans, even in settings such as the GIC where consumers pay a small fraction of
the total premium cost.

2.3. Conclusion
This chapter studies consumers’ response to differential out-of-pocket prices in tiered hospital networks. The results show that consumers respond to price incentives by substituting
31

Ericson and Starc (2014) and Ho and Lee (2015) both estimate plan demand with an ordinal measure
of network WTP.
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toward lower-priced providers, and that the magnitude of this response depends on consumer characteristics and the concentration of health care providers. To date, the majority
of research on demand response to health care prices has studied the effects on the extensive
margin of whether to purchase any health care. As the health care market increasingly exposes consumers to greater out-of-pocket price variations, understanding consumer response
to price differences across health care providers or treatments is increasingly important.
The results presented in this chapter can be interpreted as a best-case scenario for the
effects of price transparency in health care. The tiered network plans that form the subject
of this chapter provide easily accessible, explicit price information for consumers. In the
dense Boston market, consumers enrolled in tiered network plans also have access to many
providers among which to choose, lowering the barrier to substituting across providers in
response to price incentives. In Massachusetts as a whole, consumer responses are small,
and the savings from tiered networks are more likely to be outweighed by the welfare costs of
higher consumer out-of-pocket spending and muted risk-smoothing. These results highlight
how the optimal design of demand-side incentives in health insurance will vary across patient
populations and geographic markets. Policymakers and health insurers seeking to reduce
health care spending via the use of demand-side incentives need to go beyond a one-sizefits-all approach to plan design.

52

2.4. Tables and Figures
Table 8: Inpatient admissions for hospital demand model
Mean age
% female
% chronic
% in tiered plans

41.6
64.1
34.6
65.6

–
–
–
–

–
–
–
–

% of admits
Mean distance
Mean copay ($)

Non-tiered
34.4
15.1
240.2

Tier 1
31.2
11.5
268

Tier 2, 3
68.8
15.9
614.8

Summary statistics for admissions used to estimate the hospital
demand model. Two-thirds of admissions are from enrollees in
tiered plans. First column of second panel reports non-tiered plans’
share of admissions and characteristics. Columns 2 and 3 report
tiered plan admissions. Patients travel farther to hospitals in
higher-copay tiers.

Table 9: Mean hospital prices by tier
Insurer

Price (x)

HPHC
Tufts

Tier 1
1
1

Copay ($)
Tier 2
1.29
1.12

Tier 3
1.89
1.23

Tier 1
250
300

Tier 2
500
700

Tier 3
750
700

Mean within-tier hospital price as a multiple of insurer’s mean tier 1 price and outof-pocket copays in the insurer’s largest GIC plan (2011). Higher-priced hospitals
are in less preferred tiers. HPHC is Harvard Pilgrim.
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Table 10: Descriptions and prevalence of CCS diagnostic categories

54

Code

Description

Share

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Infectious and parasitic diseases
Neoplasms
Endocrine; nutritional; and metabolic diseases and immunity disorders
Diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs
Mental illness
Diseases of the nervous system and sense organs
Diseases of the circulatory system
Diseases of the respiratory system
Diseases of the digestive system
Diseases of the genitourinary system
Complications of pregnancy; childbirth; and the puerperium
Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue
Congenital anomalies
Certain conditions originating in the perinatal period
Injury and poisoning
Symptoms; signs; and ill-defined conditions
Residual codes; unclassified; all E codes

1.9
4.9
3.9
0.9
9.8
2.7
10.2
7.5
10.0
3.9
13.5
2.1
5.4
0.5
13.1
7.1
2.1
0.3

Clinical Classifications Software (CCS) diagnostic categories. First column is Level 1 code (the broadest level),
second column is description, third column is % share of nonelderly hospital discharges in Massachusetts.

Table 11: Plan enrollment inertia on GIC, fiscal years 2010–2011
Plan

2010 Enrolt.

2011 Enrolt.

% Inertial

Fallon Direct
Fallon Select
Harvard Pilgrim Independence
Health New England
Neighborhood Health Plan
Tufts Navigator
Mean across plans (weighted)

3, 034
8, 109
70, 131
20, 779
2, 759
82, 747

3, 913
10, 019
73, 486
21, 482
3, 616
85, 292

88.40
91.92
92.61
87.43
93.33
93.39
92.29

% of GIC enrollees remaining in their plans. Two new plans were introduced in 2011 (not
shown). Plan enrollments are highly inertial even following a shock to the choice set. This
inertia helps to identify the hospital demand model.
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Table 12: Hospital choice model
(1)
All Mass.
Hospital Choice
Copay ($)
Outside option
Distance (mi)
Distance2
Distance × Boston proper
Distance2 × Boston proper
Age × distance
Male × distance
Chronic cond × distance
Teaching × distance
Beds × distance
Satellite hosp campus
Cardiac CCS × cath lab
Obstetric CCS × NICU
Nerv, circ, musc CCS × MRI
Nerv CCS × neuro
% good pain control × distance
% highly recommend × distance
Hospital FEs
Observations
Pseudo R2

(2)
Boston only

-0.0002∗∗∗

(0.0001)

-0.1998∗∗∗
0.0007∗∗∗

(0.0019)
(0.0000)

-0.0001∗∗∗
0.0004
0.0205∗∗∗
-0.0060∗∗∗
0.0000∗∗∗
1.7513∗∗∗
0.6617∗∗∗
0.3253∗∗∗
-0.1055
0.2120
-0.0053∗∗∗
0.0047∗∗∗
Yes
1689941
0.529

(0.0000)
(0.0010)
(0.0011)
(0.0014)
(0.0000)
(0.1011)
(0.0993)
(0.0387)
(0.0613)
(0.2453)
(0.0006)
(0.0006)

-0.0010∗∗∗
-2.0945∗∗∗
-0.3579∗∗∗
0.0063∗∗∗
0.0692∗
-0.0064∗
-0.0005∗∗
-0.0052
0.0534∗∗∗
-0.0779∗∗∗
0.0001∗∗∗
-1.6461∗∗∗
-0.0733
0.4132∗∗∗
0.4037∗∗
0.2944
-0.0113∗
0.0106
Yes
101999
0.293

(0.0001)
(0.1221)
(0.0189)
(0.0006)
(0.0296)
(0.0025)
(0.0002)
(0.0063)
(0.0067)
(0.0120)
(0.0000)
(0.1427)
(0.1482)
(0.0729)
(0.1260)
(0.2911)
(0.0052)
(0.0063)

Multinomial logit model of hospital choice. First column includes all Massachusetts general
acute care hospitals and consumers residing anywhere in the state. Second column is subsetted
to hospitals in metropolitan Boston and consumers residing in the Boston area (the outside
option is any hospital outside of metro Boston). Consumers dislike distance and high out-ofpocket prices (copays). Hospital quality is standardized and hospital fixed-effects are incluced.
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations = hospital-admission pairs.

Table 13: Price elasticities from hospital demand model (all Mass.)
Statistic
Own elast at h’s own mean copay
Own elast at $1,000 copay
Cross elast at own mean copays
Cross elast at $1,000 copay

Min

Median

Max

−0.145
−0.244
0.000
0.000

−0.068
−0.210
0.0001
0.0002

−0.022
−0.041
0.070
0.149

Elasticities of hospital demand with respect to out-of-pocket price.
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Table 14: Price elasticities from hospital demand model (Boston only)
Statistic
Own elast at h’s own mean copay
Own elast at $1,000 copay
Cross elast at own mean copays
Cross elast at $1,000 copay

Min

Median

Max

−0.512
−0.966
0.000
0.000

−0.341
−0.904
0.009
0.019

−0.270
−0.726
0.136
0.211

Elasticities of hospital demand with respect to out-of-pocket price.

Figure 2: Variation in hospital network WTP
(b) WTP for own vs. other plans
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(a) Median WTP for hospital network, by county
WTP for 2011 Harvard Pilgrim Independence network
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Variation in WTP for hospital networks is shown across consumers by geography (Figure 2a) and across
plans within a consumer (Figure 2b). The figures are restricted to single-person households in order to
control for differences by household size. The variation in WTP helps to identify the coefficient on network
WTP in the plan demand model in Section 2.2.3. Both figures use the demand estimates from the statewide
sample, rather than the restricted Boston sample.
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Figure 3: Premiums for Harvard Pilgrim Independence plan in 2011, by family size
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Total and per-person employee premium contributions for a sample GIC plan. Premiums per person are
nonlinear in family size as a result of only two premium levels for each plan: individual coverage and family
coverage. The margin of variation in premiums across households is therefore different from the variation in
WTP across households (WTP is linear in household size, conditional on demographics). Nearly two thirds
of households purchase family coverage; the figure shows the distribution of enrolled family sizes among
those households.
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Table 15: Plan choice model (GIC FY2009–2011)

Plan Choice
WTP for hospital network ($1,000s)
Annual premium ($1,000s)
Premium ($1,000s) × std. income
PCP copay ($; baseline)
Uses tiered PCP copays
Specialist copay ($; baseline)
Mental health copay ($)
Plan FEs
Observations
Pseudo R2

No FEs

+ Plan FEs

Drop Income

1.12214∗∗∗
(0.11732)
-1.90418∗∗∗
(0.13791)
0.00003∗∗∗
(0.00000)
0.48847∗∗∗
(0.05112)
1.21754∗∗∗
(0.27263)
-0.18141∗∗∗
(0.01632)
-0.02353
(0.02221)
No
7983
0.176

0.73986∗∗∗
(0.14290)
-0.49778
(0.28712)
0.00002∗∗∗
(0.00001)
0.03956
(0.08476)
0.73238
(0.51397)
-0.16830∗∗∗
(0.03504)
-0.15594∗∗∗
(0.03660)
Yes
7983
0.383

0.78790∗∗∗
(0.14591)
-0.30168
(0.27864)

0.04863
(0.08471)
0.76091
(0.51351)
-0.17401∗∗∗
(0.03498)
-0.15657∗∗∗
(0.03655)
Yes
7990
0.381

Multinomial logit model of health insurance plan choice. Consumers prefer plans with
lower premiums and hospital networks for which they have higher WTP. Only first-time
GIC enrollees are included. In tiered plans, baseline = tier 1. Standard errors in
parentheses. Observations = plan-year-household triplets.

59

Table 16: Plan choice model: Boston (GIC FY2009–2011)
(1)
New enrolt.

(2)
All enrolt.

(3)
+ Inertia

6.36561∗∗∗
(0.76785)
1.91732∗∗∗
(0.13911)
-0.63999∗∗∗
(0.15495)
-6.71364∗∗∗
(0.78953)
0.04363∗∗∗
(0.01022)
-0.14609
(0.76505)
0.78091∗∗∗
(0.05358)
0.05374∗∗∗
(0.00410)
16069
0.425

6.35315∗∗∗
(0.28252)
3.41499∗∗∗
(0.86485)
-0.78593∗∗∗
(0.22620)
-0.22271
(0.16235)
-2.74069∗∗∗
(0.81679)
-0.13300∗∗∗
(0.02124)
3.18047∗∗∗
(0.77219)
-0.02362
(0.05083)
0.02513∗∗∗
(0.00526)
16069
0.836

Plan Choice
Previous year’s plan
WTP for hospital network ($1,000s)
Annual premium ($1,000s)
PCP copay ($; baseline)
Uses tiered PCP copays
Specialist copay ($; baseline)
Uses tiered specialist copays
Mental health copay ($)
Outpatient surgery copay ($)
Observations
Pseudo R2

3.40979∗∗∗
(0.94065)
-0.53118∗
(0.24214)
-0.19764
(0.16749)
-2.74327∗∗
(0.84454)
-0.13761∗∗∗
(0.02186)
3.49550∗∗∗
(0.77524)
-0.12524∗
(0.05690)
0.02694∗∗∗
(0.00566)
3203
0.318

Multinomial logit model of health insurance plan choice for Boston-area households. In
tiered plans, baseline = tier 1. Standard errors in parentheses. Observations = planyear-household triplets. Boston plan demand regressions do not include plan FEs.
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Table 17: Price elasticities from plan demand model, by coverage type
Plan

All Mass.

Fallon Direct
Fallon Select
Harvard Pilgrim Independence
Harvard Pilgrim Primary Choice
Health New England
Neighborhood Health Plan
Tufts Navigator
Tufts Spirit

Individual
-0.59
-0.69
-0.44
-0.58
-0.23
-0.57
-0.6
-0.62

Boston only
Family
-1.4
-1.65
-0.97
-1.4
-0.5
-1.53
-1.45
-1.52

Individual
-0.47
-1.06
-0.16
-0.82

Family
-2.26
-2.17
-0.32
-2.02

-0.3
-0.13
-1.01

-0.76
-0.27
-1.93

Elasticities of plan demand with respect to the employee’s premium contribution (usually 25% of
the total premium) for individual and family coverage. The first two columns report elasticities
among active choice enrollees in the statewide Massachusetts sample. The last two columns report
elasticities among both first-time and re-enrolling enrollees in the Boston sample.
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CHAPTER 3 : Pricing Under Tiered Networks
The aim of tiered hospital networks is to inject price competition into the health care market
by steering consumers toward lower-priced providers. Tiered networks may reduce spending
by steering demand toward lower-priced hospitals, and by putting downward pressure on
the prices themselves via the effect on price negotiations between insurers and hospitals.
Chapter 2 explored the effects of tiered networks on consumer choice of hospitals and
insurance plans, and concluded that tiered networks are effective in steering patient volume
toward preferred-tier hospitals.
This chapter presents a model describing how the demand-side effects of tiered networks
affect price negotiations between insurers and hospitals. Tiered networks introduce an additional set of incentives relative to traditional insurance plans. In agreeing to a lower
negotiated price, a hospital trades off lower per-patient revenue against higher volume due
to more preferred tier placement. Plan premiums and enrollments also respond to prices
and tiers, affecting both insurers’ and hospitals’ volumes. I derive the equilibrium negotiated price for this model, which extends the existing Nash bargaining framework from the
literature to account explicitly for the presence of tiered networks. The model is solved
for hospitals’ marginal costs of treatment, which are unobserved in the data but needed in
order to conduct counterfactual exercises to evaluate supply-side effects of tiered networks.

3.1. Bargaining Model
In stage 1 of the game outlined in Section 1.4, insurers and hospitals engage in simultaneous
bilateral bargaining over prices. The bargaining model is solved to infer hospital marginal
costs per patient, which are unobserved in the data, and used to simulate market responses
to counterfactual policy scenarios. Both insurers and hospitals are assumed to be profitmaximizers and have full information about the rest of the market. Each insurer-hospital
pair engages in simultaneous, bilateral negotiations over price. The equilibrium prices are
those that maximize the Nash product of the insurer’s and hospital’s surplus.
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A hospital’s network status impacts the surpluses through several channels. First, utilization
of the hospital by the insurer’s enrollees will change depending on the hospital’s network
status, with the highest volume when it is in the most preferred to tier and a volume of zero
when it is out of network. Second, the distribution of enrollment across plans will depend
on consumers’ valuation of the insurer’s hospital network, which is higher when hospitals
are included in more preferred tiers at lower out-of-pocket prices. When a hospital is
dropped from the network or moved to a less preferred tier, some consumers’ valuation of
the network may fall enough to cause them to enroll in a different plan for whose network
they have higher WTP. Finally, enrollment is also a function of premiums, which will change
in response to the plan’s costs as a function of hospital utilization and the share of the total
negotiated price borne by patients out-of-pocket. To account for the latter two effects on
hospital recapture of an insurer’s patients through the patients’ enrollment in other plans,
I rely on my estimates of plan demand.32
The model explicitly accounts for the multiplicity of possible tier outcomes in a tiered
network. While standard Nash bargaining models allow for only two distinct outcomes of a
negotiation—agreement and disagreement—the agreement outcome between a hospital and
an insurer using a tiered network nests multiple possible tier placements. To accommodate
this feature of the bargaining game, I leverage the institutional features of the market
to construct an approach to collapsing the multiplicity of outcomes to a single summary
measure, as described in Section 3.2.
The disagreement outcome of the negotiations is taken to be termination of business between the two parties; that is, the hospital is excluded from the insurer’s network. This
is the standard assumption in the existing literature studying narrow-network plans (Town
and Vistnes, 2001; Capps et al., 2003; Ho, 2009; Ho and Lee, 2013). Discussions with
contracting managers of Massachusetts insurers and hospitals indicate that both sides are
acutely aware of the volume and reputational repercussions of failing to reach an agreement.
32

Few papers in the literature account for plan re-sorting in insurer-provider bargaining. The notable
exceptions are Ho (2009) and Ho and Lee (2015).
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One contracting manager for a large health system colorfully describes failure to renew a
contract as “the nuclear option” that no one wants to test. Contract termination does not
appear to be an equilibrium outcome for the Massachusetts market.33
The remainder of this chapter describes the structure of the bargaining model, the estimation approach, and the empirical results. Due to the large dimensionality of the bargaining
model with tiered networks,34 I solve the bargaining model for just one insurer, Harvard
Pilgrim, and for the subset of Massachusetts hospitals located in metropolitan Boston.
Harvard Pilgrim is the largest insurer in my data and the second-largest overall in Massachusetts. Other insurers’ negotiated prices and product characteristics are held fixed
at their observed equilibrium values, so competition across insurers is captured primarily
through competition in the plan demand stage.

3.2. Mapping Prices to Tiers
I model each insurer-hospital pair’s negotiated price as a single base price that applies to
all of the insurer’s enrollees35 and is scaled by the production resource intensity for each
patient’s diagnosis. Each insurer-hospital pair negotiates a price schedule, which is a vector
of prices for various treatments, and is collapsed to a base price according to a formula set
by the state of Massachusetts. This base price is a casemix-deflated average price paid to the
hospital for treating the insurer’s patients. The casemix adjustment converts all hospitals’
prices to a comparable scale by accounting for cross-hospital variation in the complexity of
diagnoses and treatments for each hospital’s patient population.
33

In one near counter-example in November 2011, BCBS and Tufts Medical Center, along with its affiliated physicians, announced that their contract would lapse due to unsuccessful negotiations (Weisman
and Kowalczyk, 2011). With both parties facing media scrutiny and intense pressure from patients, a new
agreement was reached by December of the same year (Weisman, 2011). Under certain market conditions,
theory predicts that profit-maximizing insurers will include every hospital in their networks (Capps et al.,
2003).
34
The computational challenges associated with the model’s dimensionality are detailed in the section on
dimensionality reduction.
35
Insurers typically have a single price schedule for all commercially insured patients and separate schedules
for Medicare and Medicaid patients. Since this dissertation focuses solely on the commercial market, only
the commercial enrollee price schedule enters into the model.
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The price adjustment formula is fixed by the state and uses 3M’s All Patient Refined Diagnosis Related Groups (APR-DRGs) (Massachusetts, 2010; CHIA, 2015a). Insurers then
rank hospitals by their base prices (simply called “prices” from here on), and determine hospitals’ tiers based on those prices. Some insurers make further adjustments to the assigned
tiers based on hospitals’ geographic isolation or negotiated prices with the hospital system’s
affiliated physician groups. However, such adjustments are generally minimal, affecting
0–13% of hospitals in an insurer’s network.36 Discussions with the provider contracting divisions of several anonymous, large Massachusetts insurers indicate that this is an accurate
representation of their negotiations with providers and their network design.
In the estimation, I simplify the bargaining problem by using the base price as the immediate
object of negotiations. For a given patient’s diagnosis, the price paid to the hospital is then
the product of the base price and a production resource intensity multiplier for that diagnosis
using the APR-DRG system. This parameterization of total price as a base price multiplied
by a disease weight is motivated by institutional features of pricing in health care. Due to
the large number of health care services for which prices must be agreed upon, prices are
not typically negotiated service-by-service. Instead, payers such as Medicare and private
insurers often negotiate a base price which is then scaled by a measure of resource intensity,
such as a DRG weight or a Relative Value Unit (RVU). This parameterization of prices is
also used by Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015) and Ho and Lee (2015).37
The bargaining model must accommodate the key features of the data. First, unlike in a
standard Nash bargaining model where only the discrete outcomes of agreement and disagreement are possible, the model must nest multiple discrete possibilities for the agreement
36

In principle, insurers can use quality metrics in addition to price in setting hospital tiers (Massachusetts,
2010). However, I find that in practice, including hospital quality measures does not change hospitals’ tier
assignments relative to a baseline of using price alone. The overwhelming majority of Massachusetts hospitals
score very high on most quality measures during the study period, typically above 90 points out of a possible
100, so that most of the variation across providers is in prices rather than measured quality.
37
While other payment arrangements also exist in the market, such as disease-specific negotiated prices
and global payments, discussions with Massachusetts hospitals and insurers suggest that base prices scaled
by diagnosis severities are often the starting point for negotiations even when other payment arrangements
are used.
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outcome (corresponding to different hospital tiers). Second, the model must rationalize the
fact that the distribution of hospital prices in the market is smooth. I accommodate both of
these features by introducing a smooth stochastic mapping from negotiated price to hospital
tier. The most straightforward extension of standard bargaining models to the context of
tiered networks is price bargaining where the negotiated price maps deterministically into
the hospital’s tier. However, this version of the model yields substantial price bunching just
below the would-be cutoffs between tiers, which is inconsistent with the data.38 Therefore,
in the bargaining estimation, I rely on the stochastic tier version of the model described in
this section.
Figures 4 and 5a show the distribution of Harvard Pilgrim’s negotiated prices with Massachusetts hospitals (excluding satellite campuses). Prices are reported as multiples of the
insurer’s mean hospital price (data confidentiality considerations preclude reporting dollar
amounts). There is no bunching of prices in regions around the threshold between tiers
(Figure 4). While the bulk of the price distribution mass within each tier does not overlap
with the bulk of prices in other tiers, there are no hard price cutoffs separating the tiers
(Figure 5a). Furthermore, tiers are determined primarily by prices, rather than by consumer
valuation of hospitals. Figures 5a and 5b show the distribution across tiers of hospital prices
and consumer valuation of hospitals, as measured by hospital fixed effects from the demand
model. Whereas the distribution of negotiated prices varies substantially across tiers, the
distribution of hospital demand fixed effects is stable and provides little explanatory power
for tier assignment. Motivated by these observations, I fit smooth functions mapping a
hospital’s price as a multiple of the overall mean price across hospitals to the hospital’s
probability of placement in each of three tiers. I use generalized logistic functions for the
most and least preferred tiers, denoted Gt (p) = Pr(tier = t|p), where t ∈ {1, 3} is the tier
and p is price. For the middle tier, the probability is modeled as G2 (p) = 1− G1 (p) + G3 (p) .




Each tier mapping is continuous and differentiable in price, with the derivative with respect
38
There exist parameter combinations that generate an interior solution for price that falls strictly between
the tier cutoffs, but their ranges are narrow and would not hold for more than a small fraction of hospitals
in a given market.
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to price denoted g t (p) =

∂
t
∂p G (p).

The functions G1 (p), G3 (p) are fit to Harvard Pilgrim’s

observed tiers and prices for 2010–2013 using nonlinear least squares.
The fitted price-to-tier mappings for Harvard Pilgrim are shown in Figure 6. Low prices
imply a higher probability of the hospital ending up in the most preferred tier with the
lowest out-of-pocket price (tier 1). As price increases, the probability of placement in the
least preferred, highest out-of-pocket price tier (tier 3) approaches unity. The mapping
from relative price to tier approximates the insurer’s tiering strategy in a computationally
tractable fashion. The approximation relies on the assumption that the mapping from
relative price to hospital tier remains constant in counterfactual scenarios. This assumption
does not require the mapping from a hospital’s raw price to its tier to remain unchanged
in new equilibria. Rather, it only requires the less restrictive condition that the mapping
from a hospital’s price relative to other hospitals in the insurer’s network remain constant.
This allows for the mapping from raw prices to tiers to change as the distribution of prices
shifts in new equilibria.39 The mapping also relies on the assumption that hospitals’ tier
probabilities are independent from other hospitals in the network, conditional on the mean
price.
The mapping is assumed to be observed by all insurers and hospitals at the time of price
negotiations. Each player’s expected surplus from agreement in negotiations is therefore an
expectation over the possible tier placements resulting from the negotiated price. Uncertainty over tier placement is resolved after all bilateral insurer-hospital negotiations have
concluded. The remainder of this section presents the model for insurer and hospital surplus,
and the Nash bargaining solution under tiered hospital networks.
39

This setup still assumes that the insurer’s mapping is somewhat exogenous, rather than treating it
fully as an equilibrium object. Future work could endogenize insurers’ tier-setting formulas. Since little is
understood about the effect of demand-side incentives on health care prices, the current setup represents a
non-negligible step forward in the understanding of tiered networks and other innovations in health insurance
design.
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3.3. Insurer Objectives
The insurer’s profits are determined by premiums, enrollment, negotiated hospital prices,
hospital utilization, and consumer out-of-pocket payments. Each insurer M ∈ M may have
multiple health insurance plans m ∈ M. A plan’s total enrollment is given by integrating a
household ι’s probability of enrollment across households that have the plan in their choice
sets, based on the distributions of sickness probabilities fid and consumer characteristics
xid for household members i ∈ ι. Note that plan shares smι , hospital shares σmhid , and
premiums rmι depend on the characteristics of other plans in the market; these are suppressed from the notation for parsimony but enter into the empirical application. Consider
first the insurer’s profit when hospital tiers are already known, after the bargaining and tier
determination stage of the game outlined in Section 1.4. Insurer M’s total revenue from
plan m is
Revm =

X

(rmι smι )

ι∈I

where rmι is the plan’s premium for household ι (individual or family premium, depending
on the household’s size), and smι is household ι’s probability of enrollment in plan m. Note
that the share of consumers enrolling in the plan depends on the other plan offerings in the
market.
The plan’s total cost is equal to the insurer’s expected outlays for plan m’s enrollees to visit
their chosen hospitals h




Costm =

X
ι∈I

smι

XX
i∈ι d∈D



fid

X

(σmhid [ld pMh − cmh ])

h∈H

where σmhid is consumer i’s probability of going to hospital h when sick with diagnosis d,
which the consumer contracts with probability fid ; pMh is the baseline negotiated price; ld
is the disease-specific multiplier adjusting the base price to the diagnosis; and cmh is the
consumer’s out-of-pocket price portion for hospital h in plan m. The out-of-pocket price is
set according to hospital h’s tier when m is a tiered-network plan, and is assumed not to
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vary across hospitals when m is a non-tiered plan.40 Since the plans with tiered networks
in my data use copays rather than coinsurance, the consumer’s out-of-pocket price cmh is
an absolute amount that does not vary with price, conditional on the hospital’s tier. For
purposes of brevity, denote by Vmhi =

P

d∈D fid σmhid ld

hospital h’s total expected casemix-

adjusted volume for consumer i in plan m, and by Cmhi =

P

d∈D fid σmhid cmh

consumer

i’s total expected out-of-pocket payments to hospital h under plan m. Then insurer M’s
expected profit from plans m ∈ M, given hospitals’ tiers in its network, is

tiers
Πknown
=
M

X X





smι rmι −

XX

(pMh Vmhi − Cmhi ) .

i∈ι h∈H

ι∈I m∈M

Now consider stage 1 of the game outlined in Section 1.4, before uncertainty over hospital
tiers is resolved. The insurer’s expected profit is now an expectation over the tier assignments for the hospitals in its network. Denote by τ ∈ T the possible permutations of
hospitals’ tiers in the insurer’s network, with each hospital h’s tier denoted th ∈ τ . Then
the insurer’s expected profit can be expressed as

ΠM =


XY
τ ∈T

where

Q

th ∈τ



th ∈τ

h
GtM
(pMh )


X X



τ
−
sτmι rmι

XX
i∈ι h∈H

ι∈I m∈M



(pMh Vmhi − Cmhi ) (3.1)


h
GtM
(pMh ) is the probability of network tier permutation τ as a function of ne-

gotiated hospital prices. Due to the assumption of independence of GtM (p) across hospitals,
this probability is simply the product of the individual hospitals’ probabilities of the tier
they occupy in a given tier permutation, Pr (tierh = th ∈ τ ). The sum of the network tier
probabilities across all tier permutations

P

τ ∈T

nQ

th ∈τ

o

h
GtM
(pMh )

is equal to one. Note

τ
τ change with
that plan shares sτmι , hospital shares σmhid
, copays cτmh , and premiums rmι

network tiers τ . In negotiations with a hospital, the insurer’s objective is composed of its
40
In practice, some non-tiered plans in Massachusetts use coinsurance for hospital care, so that consumers’
out-of-pocket cost of care is a fixed percentage of the negotiated price with a given hospital. This can vary
across hospitals. However, I make the simplifying assumption that consumers’ expected out-of-pocket cost
for hospital care in a non-tiered plan does not vary across hospitals. This assumption is supported by the
finding in the literature that consumers are generally uninformed about hospital prices before they are billed;
and even savvy consumers who ask for price quotes typically get poor response rates (Bebinger, 2014).
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expected profit in the case of agreement less the expected profit in the case of disagreement,
with profits defined by Equation 3.1.41

3.4. Hospital Objectives
Now consider a hospital’s expected profit given a set of prices and networks in the market.
The hospital’s profits are determined by insurance plan enrollments, the hospital’s share of
each plan’s enrollees, and negotiated prices. The hospital may treat patients from multiple
insurers N ∈ M , and changes in its network tier may affect insurance plan enrollments
via consumers’ changing valuation of the hospital network and via premiums. When tier
assignments are known, the hospital’s expected profit is



tiers
Πknown
h

=

X

=

X

X

snι

ι∈I n∈N ∈M

XX

(fid σnhid ld [pN h − kh ])

i∈ι d∈D

"
X

ι∈I n∈N ∈M

where Vnhi =

P

d∈D fid σnhid ld

#

snι

X

(pN h − kh ) Vnhi

i∈ι

is hospital h’s total expected casemix-adjusted volume for

consumer i in plan n; pN h is the hospital’s baseline negotiated price with insurer N ∈ M ,
which applies to all of the insurer’s plans n ∈ N ; kh is the hospital’s marginal cost of
treating a patient with a diagnosis severity weight of one; and ld is the disease-specific
resource intensity use multiplier. Each hospital is assumed to have a baseline marginal
treatment cost per patient kh that is constant for all commercially insured patients with a
diagnosis severity weight of one. For a given patient’s diagnosis, the cost and price are scaled
to ld kh and ld pN h , respectively, based on the resource intensity associated with diagnosis
d. As is typical in the industrial organization literature, marginal costs are not observed.
They are inferred from the solution to the bargaining model and used in the counterfactual
exercises.
Now consider the stage of the game before uncertainty over hospital tiers is resolved. The
hospital’s expected profit is now an expectation over its own tier assignment and the tier
41

A list of the symbols used throughout the dissertation is provided in the appendix (page 105).
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assignments of other hospitals in Harvard Pilgrim’s network, with other insurers’ networks
taken as fixed. As before, denote by τ ∈ T the possible permutations of hospitals’ tiers in
the network, with each hospital h’s tier denoted th ∈ τ . Denote Harvard Pilgrim as insurer
M with plans m, and the other insurers in the market N ∈ M \M. Then the hospital’s
expected profit can be expressed as

Πh =


XY
τ ∈T

+



(
h
(pMh )
GtM

th ∈τ

X
n∈N ∈M \M

where

Q

th ∈τ

sτnι

X
i∈ι

"
X

X

ι∈I

m∈M

sτmι

X

τ
(pMh − kh ) Vmhi

i∈ι



τ 
(pN h − kh ) Vnhi


(3.2)

h
GtM
(pMh ) is the probability of Harvard Pilgrim’s network tier permutation

τ as a function of negotiated hospital prices. In negotiations with Harvard Pilgrim, the
hospital’s objective is composed of its expected profit in the case of agreement less the
expected profit in the case of disagreement, with profits defined by Equation 3.2. When a
hospital is a member of a system h ∈ S, the relevant profit is the hospital system’s overall
profits summed across all hospitals in the system. Member hospitals within systems are
allowed to have separate marginal costs and negotiate separate prices with the insurer, but
the overall surplus from the negotiation is determined at the system level.

3.5. Premium Setting
In negotiating new prices with hospitals in its network, an insurer can adjust plan premiums
to reflect the new cost structure implied by hospital prices and tiers. I let Harvard Pilgrim
adjust its premiums for GIC plans, the section of the market on which plan demand is
estimated (see Section 1.5.2). The insurer offers two plans on the GIC market, one that
includes all Massachusetts hospitals in its network and another using a narrow network
(Table 2). There are four premiums associated with these plans: one for individual coverage
and another for family coverage for each plan. Motivated by the institutional features of
the GIC described in Section 2.2.2, I take the ratios of each premium in relationship to the
full-network plan’s individual premium as exogenous. The ratio of a plan’s family premium
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to its individual premium is 2.4 and the ratio of the insurer’s narrow-network plan to the
insurer’s full-network plan is 0.8. In the bargaining estimation, I fix these ratios between
plan premiums but allow all four premiums to shift together in response to negotiated prices
and networks.
Premium shifting as a function of prices and tiers is modeled assuming the insurer has
a constant profit margin bound by regulation. The state of Massachusetts has minimum
medical loss ratio (MLR) regulations, which set an upper bound on insurer profit margins
by dictating a minimum fraction of premium revenue that insurers must spend on their
enrollees’ medical care (Massachusetts, 2010). The MLR regulations require insurers to
spend at least 85% of premium revenue in large-group plans on medical expenses42 , and
insurers whose medical spending falls short of the target are required to issue premium
rebates to their enrollees. Moreover, the GIC’s actuaries are directly involved in premiumsetting for the plans offered to its employees. On the GIC market, 90% of premiums
are generally disbursed in the form of payment to health care providers (GIC, 2011). I
therefore assume that hospital price changes are passed through to GIC premiums at a rate
of 1/0.9 times the change in expected spending as a result of the price change. Simulations
using my hospital and plan demand estimates indicate that the MLR does indeed bind
for Harvard Pilgrim’s GIC plans at current market conditions, and the MLR assumption
provides substantial modeling and computational advantages for the bargaining model.
In response to a change in the negotiated price pMh with hospital h, Harvard Pilgrim’s
baseline premium r changes as a function of the change in expected spending
∂r
∂pMh







=


X 
∂ 1 X 
τ
τ
τ
τ

(pMh Vmhi
− Cmhi
)+
pMj Vmji
− Cmji
∂pMh λ i∈ι∈m
j∈H\h

=

1 X τ
V
λ i∈ι∈m mhi

where λ = 0.9 is the GIC-specific MLR and the tier structure is held fixed. Conditional
42
On the individual and small-group market, the MLR requires insurers to spend 90% of premium revenue
on medical expenses.
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on hospitals’ tiers, hospital shares within the plan remain unchanged as prices change
because consumers only respond to the out-of-pocket copays dictated by tiers, so that
τ /∂p
∂Vmji
Mh = 0∀j ∈ H\h. Next, consider the effect of the premium change on Harvard

Pilgrim’s enrollment. Since the price change is passed through to premiums for both of Harvard Pilgrim’s plans, each of its m ∈ M plans’ share responds not only to its own premium
change but also to the insurer’s other plan’s m0 ∈ M\m premium change. Accounting for
this multi-product feature of the insurer, the change in a Harvard Pilgrim plan’s probability
of enrolling household ι in response to negotiated price is
∂sτmι
∂pMh

=

τ
∂sτmι ∂rmι
·
τ
∂rmι
∂pMh











X
X
X
δ1
τ 
τ 
= − (sτmι ) (1 − sτmι ) 
Vmhi
−
sτm0 ι 
Vmhi
λ
i∈ι0 ∈m
m0
i∈ι0 ∈m

where δ1 > 0 is the coefficient on premiums in plan demand. This formula is similar to
the standard derivative of market share with respect to price in multinomial logit demand
models (Train, 2002), with the addition of terms to account for the fact that Harvard Pilgrim
is a multi-product firm whose prices (premiums) change in tandem for multiple products.
Other insurers on the GIC market may also experience a change in enrollment in response to
Harvard Pilgrim’s negotiated prices with hospitals, since the new Harvard Pilgrim premiums
will affect consumers’ probability of enrollment in all plans in the market. For a plan n ∈
/M
offered by a different insurer, the change in enrollment by household ι is
∂sτnι
∂pMh

=

X  ∂sτ
nι
m∈M

τ
∂rmι

·

τ
∂rmι
∂pMh
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The MLR assumption implies that all plan enrollments are differentiable in negotiated
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hospital prices. This structure provides substantial modeling and computational advantages
for the bargaining model by abstracting away from Bertrand-Nash competition in premiums,
for which there is no closed-form solution. Since my simulations suggest that the MLR
binds for Harvard Pilgrim’s GIC plans, I take this to be a reasonable approximation of
the market. This approach provides a middle road between papers on insurer-hospital
bargaining that abstract from plan demand altogether (e.g., Gowrisankaran et al. (2015))
and those modeling a full Bertrand-Nash game in premiums (e.g., Ho and Lee (2015)).

3.6. Nash Bargaining
The object of the negotiations is the price pMh paid to hospital h for treating each of Harvard Pilgrim’s patients, which enters into both parties’ expected profits. Prices determine
hospital tiers in Harvard Pilgrim’s network, which in turn affect hospital volume conditional
on plan enrollment, insurer costs, and household WTP for plans. Harvard Pilgrim also adjusts plan premiums in response to negotiated prices and hospital tiers, and premiums affect
both per-enrollee revenues and plan enrollments.
Denote by HM ⊆ H the subset of Massachusetts hospitals that are in Harvard Pilgrim’s
network. The insurer’s surplus from coming to an agreement with a given hospital system,
SM(S) , can then be denoted by SM(S) = ΠM (S ∈ HM ) − ΠM (S ∈
/ HM ); similarly, hospital
system S’s surplus is SS(M) = ΠS (S ∈ HM ) − ΠS (S ∈
/ HM ). Since the equilibrium in
this market is such that all hospitals reach agreements with all insurers, the second term is
calculated assuming that all other hospitals j ∈ H\S remain in the insurer’s network in the
event of a disagreement. In the case of hospital systems, it is assumed that in the case of
disagreement, all system members h ∈ S are excluded from the insurer’s network, so that
the insurer’s overall surplus from the negotiation is determined at the system level. The set
of hospitals belonging to hospital h’s system is denoted by Sh . For standalone hospitals, h
is equal to the singleton Sh .
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The equilibrium negotiated price p∗Mh maximizes the Nash bargaining product


SM(S)

bM(S) 

· SS(M)

bS(M)

,

where bM(S) and bS(M) are the insurer’s and hospital’s respective bargaining weights, normalized so that bM(S) = 1 − bS(M) . The bargaining model is solved for unobserved hospital
marginal costs per patient kh using first-order conditions with respect to negotiated prices.
Member hospitals within systems are modeled as having separate marginal costs and negotiating separate prices with the insurer. The assumptions of a stochastic price to tier
mapping and MLR premium setting yield a Nash bargaining solution that is continuous
and differentiable in prices. Taking the logarithm of the Nash bargaining product, the first
order condition for the price p∗Mh is then given by
∂
log [ΠM (Sh ∈ HM ) − ΠM (Sh ∈
/ HM )]
∂p∗Mh
∂
−bSh (M) ∗ log [ΠSh (Sh ∈ HM ) − ΠSh (Sh ∈
/ HM )]
∂pMh

bM(Sh )
=

which simplifies to

bM(Sh )
=

∂
ΠM (Sh
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∈ HM )

ΠM (Sh ∈ HM ) − ΠM (Sh ∈
/ HM )

−bSh (M)

∂
ΠSh (Sh
∂p∗
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∈ HM )

ΠSh (Sh ∈ HM ) − ΠSh (Sh ∈
/ HM )

(3.3)

The left-hand side of Equation 3.3 is the insurer’s component of the first-order conditions,
while the right-hand side is the hospital’s component into which hospital costs kh enter.
Profits are defined as in Equations 3.1 and 3.2, and the first-order conditions are solved
using the derivatives of premiums and plan shares with respect to price derived in Section
3.5. The denominators of the first-order conditions will be identical for all hospitals within
a single system j ∈ Sh for a given set of prices. The numerators, on the other hand, are
derivatives of the system-level surplus with respect to a single hospital’s negotiated price
with the insurer, and are therefore defined separately for each hospital in a system.
Due to notational complexity, I present to the left-hand and right-hand side of the first75

τ
order conditions separately. To further simplify notation, denote by GMh
the product
τ
of probabilities of network tier permutation τ for all hospitals except h, that is GMh
=

Q

t

tj ∈τ \th

j
τ ,
h ∈τ
GM
(pMj ). Then the total probability of network arrangement τ is GtM
(pMh ) GMh

th ∈τ
τ , where g th ∈τ (p
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Insurer’s Component of FOCs: The numerator of the insurer’s component of the firstorder conditions (the left-hand side of Equation 3.3) is
insurer numerator
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which captures the multiple channels through which changes in the negotiated price affect
insurer surplus. The first term captures the hospital tier effect: as price moves, so too
does the probability that the hospital will be in a given tier in the insurer’s network. An
increase in the negotiated price reduces the probability of the hospital being assigned to a
preferred tier. Less preferred tier assignment affects the insurer’s surplus by reducing the
hospital’s volume of the insurer’s patients and raising the portion of price borne out-ofpocket by consumers. The second term captures the effect on total premium revenue and
total costs as a function of the number and composition of enrolled households. Households
reoptimize their enrollment decisions as a function of their changed WTP for the insurer’s
hospital network and the changing premium. Higher price and less preferred tier assignment
increase the expected out-of-pocket price to consumers, which reduces consumer WTP for
43

A list of the symbols used throughout the dissertation is provided in the appendix (page 105).
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the network but has an ambiguous effect on insurer costs and premiums. If the negotiated
price is in a region where tier probability is changing quickly, then total spending increases
due to small increases in price may be offset by consumers’ greater out-of-pocket spending,
so the insurer’s spending and therefore premiums may fall. For larger changes in price,
the effect of price increases is generally to increase spending and premiums, which will
reduce the insurer’s surplus if the premium changes are large enough to reduce enrollment.
Finally, the third term captures the direct effect of changing premiums and prices. As price
conditional on tier rises, per-household premium revenue rises but per-admission costs also
rise.
The denominator of the insurer’s component of the FOCs is
insurer denominator

=
X
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where τ \h is the insurer’s network when it is identical to tier permutation τ except that
hospital h is out of network. Premiums, plan enrollments, and hospital volumes conditional
on enrollment are allowed to vary based on whether the hospital is in network. Other
hospitals’ prices are held fixed since the FOC is a Nash equilibrium object.
The overall effect of price on the insurer’s portion of the FOC as defined in Equations 3.4
and 3.5 is ambiguous. The effect of price on the insurer’s surplus will depend on household
WTP for the hospital, differences in out-pocket-price across copays, and enrollment response
to network WTP and premiums.

77

Hospital’s Component of FOCs: The numerator of the hospital’s component of the
first-order conditions (the right-hand side of Equation 3.3) is
hospital numerator

=

(3.6)
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which captures the multiple channels through which changes in the negotiated price affect
hospital surplus. The first three terms are composed of objects pertaining to both the
negotiating hospital h and other system members j ∈ Sh . The first term captures the
hospital tier effect, analogous to its effect on the numerator of the insurer’s component.
As price increases, the probability of the hospital being assigned to a preferred tier falls,
which affects the hospital’s surplus by reducing the hospital’s volume of patients from the
insurer. The second and third terms capture changes in plan enrollment in the negotiating
insurer’s plans and the insurer’s competitors’ plans, as households reoptimize their enrollment decisions due to changing WTP and premiums. Less preferred tier assignment reduces
household WTP for the insurer’s network, which may result in consumers re-sorting to other
insurers. However, the less-preferred tier placement may also lead to lower total spending
by the plan, in which case premiums may fall enough to offset the decrease in WTP. The two
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plan enrollment terms capture the effect on the hospital’s total volume and the fraction of
that volume for which the hospital is reimbursed at each of the insurers’ negotiated prices.
The effect on hospital revenue is ambiguous, and depends on whether the bulk of the hospital’s volume comes from its highest-reimbursing insurers. The plan enrollment effect allows
hospitals to recapture the negotiating insurer’s patients that are lost due to network or
premium changes through other insurers. Finally, the fourth term captures the direct effect
of changing prices. As price rises, so too does the hospital’s per-admission reimbursement
for the insurer’s patients. This direct price effect term is composed exclusively of objects
relevant to the negotiating hospital h, making the term identical irrespective of whether the
hospital is a member of a system or operated as a standalone facility.
The denominator of the hospital’s component of the FOCs is
hospital denominator

=
X
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where τ \h is the insurer’s network when it is identical to tier permutation τ except that
hospital h is out of network. Plan enrollments and hospital volumes conditional on enrollment are allowed to vary based on whether the hospital system is in network. The hospital’s
negotiated prices with other insurers are held fixed since the FOC is a Nash equilibrium
object.
The overall effect of price on the hospital’s portion of the FOC as defined in Equations 3.6
and 3.7 is ambiguous. The effect of price on the hospital’s surplus will depend on consumer
preference for the hospital, as well as the hospital’s effect on enrollment through overall
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network WTP and premiums. Generally, hospitals with very high negotiated prices, such
as “star” hospitals, have little to lose from negotiating even higher prices. Such hospitals
are overwhelmingly likely to be in the least preferred tier regardless of moderate changes in
price, so that higher prices will result in higher per-patient revenue and no loss in volume
conditional on plan enrollments. For hospitals with mid-range prices, either due to lower
consumer preference or other factors, there is a clearer trade-off between gains in per-patient
revenue and losses of volume as a result of higher prices.
Solving for Unobserved Parameters: Equations 3.4–3.7 are combined to solve the
first-order conditions as given in Equation 3.3 for hospital marginal costs per patient kh . The
τ
h ∈τ
entry of tier probabilities GtM
(pMh ) GMh
into the first-order conditions implies that prices

are not linearly related to hospital costs, unlike in existing bargaining models that build
on the inversion proposed by Berry (1994). Each hospital h’s cost parameter is identified
from its first-order condition with respect to its price pMh . I calibrate the hospital cost
parameter using Equation 3.3, focusing on a small subset of hospitals due to computational
burden.
In the empirical application, the bargaining weights are assumed to be symmetric, bM(Sh ) =
bSh (M) = 0.5. The symmetry assumption implies that any observed differences in hospitals’
mark-ups that are not rationalized by patient preferences through the demand model will
load onto hospital marginal costs kh . A higher bargaining weight for hospitals bSh (M) > 0.5
would imply market conditions closer to hospitals setting prices unilaterally (i.e. closer to
insurers being price-takers). Ho and Lee (2015) find estimates of bargaining weights that
are not far from 0.5 in their primary specification, but Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) reject
the hypothesis of symmetric bargaining weights for two of three insurers in their data.44
44

Future work will estimate the bargaining weights for each hospital-insurer pair by leveraging data on
multiple years of price negotiations for each hospital. If hospital costs kh are assumed to remain constant
over time (a linear time trend can also be accommodated with an additional degree of freedom), then costs
and bargaining weights are separately identified up to a normalization using first-order conditions from
multiple years.
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Dimensionality Reduction: The large number of possible permutations of hospitals’
tiers in the insurer’s network requires an approach to reducing the dimensionality of the
problem. I leverage the fact that a hospital’s volume is disproportionately affected by
the network status of its closest competitors. The dimensionality of the expectation of
insurer and hospital surplus over the set of all possible hospital tier permutations T 3 τ is
exponential in the number of competing hospitals. For H hospitals in the market, there are
3H + H · 3H−1 possible permutations of hospital tiers, of which 3H are permutations with
all hospitals in the insurer’s network and H · 3H−1 are the permutations excluding exactly
one hospital from the network. In the Massachusetts hospital market with 72 general acute
care hospitals,45 the number of computations required to take a full expectation over all
possible network permutations is on the order of 5.6 × 1035 , far exceeding the computational
capacity available to both firms and the econometrician.
I proceed by assuming that in price negotiations, firms take an expectation over the network
status of only the closest Nh < H competitors for the hospital in question, and hold fixed all
other hospitals’ tiers. The closest competitors are defined as those hospitals with which the
negotiating hospital has the largest cross-price elasticities implied by the hospital demand
model. In practice, the cross-price elasticity measure of closeness of competition is highly
correlated with geographical closeness for the majority of hospitals.46 The intuition for the
assumption that negotiating firms only take an expectation over the closest competitors’
tiers is that local market conditions are the most relevant information in the negotiation.
A given hospital h’s negotiated price responds little to changes in the network status of a
hospital j that barely competes for patients with h, as will be shown in my results by the
many hospital pairs with cross-price elasticities of essentially zero (Table 14). Thus, the
computational cost of taking j’s network status uncertainty into account typically exceeds
the gain from the negligible adjustment in h’s price that a full expectation over j’s network
45

This includes hospitals’ secondary satellite campuses.
The large, prestigious academic medical centers draw patients from a substantially broader geographic
region than does the typical hospital, and their closest competitors as measured by cross-price elasticities
are typically other academic medical centers.
46
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status would imply. Executives of an anonymous large insurer confirm that during negotiations, a hospital typically only takes into account the network status of a small set of
competitors.

3.7. Bargaining Model Results
I use the bargaining model to infer hospitals’ marginal costs of treating a patient, which
are unobserved in the data, from the hospitals’ first-order conditions when negotiating
prices with Harvard Pilgrim. The bargaining model is solved for the year 2011, the most
recent year for which I measure GIC premiums prior to the differential premium discount
program in fiscal year 2012. I solve the model for the 17 hospitals located in metropolitan
Boston (Table 18) using a subsample Boston-area patients. These hospitals include a mix of
academic medical centers, teaching hospitals, community hospitals, and Disproportionate
Share Hospitals serving a disproportionately low-income patient population. Five hospital
systems are represented among these hospitals, including the large statewide system Steward
Health Care and the two Harvard-affiliated systems, Partners HealthCare and CareGroup.
The CareGroup consists of the three Beth Israel Deaconess–affiliated hospitals and Mount
Auburn Hospital. The Partners system is larger, consisting of eight hospital campuses
throughout the state. Partners includes the prestigious Brigham and Women’s Hospital and
Massachusetts General Hospital, as well as several other hospitals both within and outside
of Boston. Among Boston area patients, 74% of observed admissions are to hospitals in
metropolitan Boston and an additional 25% are to hospitals in the Boston area. Among
the subset of Boston area patients residing in metropolitan Boston, 96% of admissions are
to hospitals in metropolitan Boston. The metropolitan Boston hospitals are geographic
neighbors and many of the hospital pairs have high cross-price elasticities implied by the
hospital demand model. Intuitively, these hospitals can be thought of as constituting a
submarket of the state’s full hospital market.
Due to the high computational cost of calculating hospital choice, hospital network WTP,
and plan demand for a large number of households, I use a random sample of 1,000 Boston
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area households.47 In solving the FOCs, I also assume that insurers and hospitals are in a
long-run equilibrium with respect to plan enrollments. The intuition is that the observed
market equilibrium reflects a longer planning horizon than a single enrollment year, so that
household inertia plays at most a small role. Insurers and hospitals plan for a longer horizon
in their negotiations, both because their contracts are typically in force for several years
and because even if individual households are inertial in plan choices, employer groups can
respond more quickly to changes in health insurance prices. If the majority of households
are assumed to be inertial and the assumption of MLR premium-setting (Section 3.5) is
maintained, this would imply that it would be in both the insurer’s and the hospital’s
interests to increase prices almost arbitrarily, since insurers could raise their premiums in
step with price increases without losing market share. In practice, insurers would eventually
lose enrollment; but since the model cannot explicitly account for such dynamic effects, I
instead assume that the long-run equilibrium conditions hold for the purposes of solving the
static model. The longer horizon assumption is operationalized by shutting down inertia in
plan enrollment, which is equivalent to assuming that all households are in an active choice
enrollment period.
Table 19 reports the hospital price-cost margins implied by the bargaining model, with
respect to negotiated prices with Harvard Pilgrim. Costs kh are the hospital’s marginal
cost of treating a patient with a disease severity weight of ld = 1, so that they adjust for
differences in patient mix across hospitals. Margins are reported in the second column as
a percentage of cost. The lowest-volume hospitals—Beth Israel Deaconess - Needham, as
well as the Somerville and Whidden campuses of Cambridge Health Alliance—tend to have
the smallest (most negative) margins. By contrast, the large academic medical centers have
margins closer to zero. Negative margins indicate that the hospital’s implied marginal cost
exceeds the observed price.
Table 19 also reports the implied insurer and hospital surpluses from agreement at the
47

Each individual-diagnosis-hospital-plan combination requires a separate observation.
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hospital system level, and scaled by each hospital system’s implied total casemix-weighted
volume. A hospital system may have positive surplus from contracting with Harvard Pilgrim
even in the case of negative margins due to the fact that Harvard Pilgrim’s prices exceed
competing insurers’ prices by 15–55%, as calculated from the Massachusetts APCD. Many
of the other insurers rely more heavily on global payments and other alternative payment
methods, which are not directly tied to hospital volume. Competing insurers’ prices are
scaled up to 110% of the values calculated from the APCD to account for this disparity. For
Harvard Pilgrim itself, I account for alternative payments in greater detail using hospital
system-level data on the fraction of payments that are attributable to non-fee for service
payments, with an average of 30% for the insurer as a whole.48 These additional payments
are then included in the surplus calculations if the hospital system is in Harvard Pilgrim’s
network, and excluded if the system is out of network. The global payments do not enter
into the determination of hospitals’ tier placement conditional on negotiated prices.
The implied surplus from agreement is positive for Harvard Pilgrim with respect to all
hospital systems. That is, the bargaining model predicts higher profits for the insurer in
the case of an inclusive hospital network than in the case of a network excluding any one
hospital system. This is consistent with the full set of contracts observed in the market. The implied hospital system surplus from agreement with Harvard Pilgrim is negative
for Partners HealthCare System. A negative surplus is not consistent with the observed
Partners–Harvard Pilgrim contract in the market. However, half of the Partners system’s
hospitals are outside of metropolitan Boston, meaning that a large fraction of the system’s
potential gains from contracting with Harvard Pilgrim is left out when solving the FOCs.

3.8. Conclusion
This chapter extends the literature on price bargaining in markets lacking posted prices
by building a bargaining framework that accommodates complex insurance designs that
48

System-level data on Harvard Pilgrim’s global payments are available for the Partners, CareGroup, and
Steward systems. For the remaining hospitals, I assume that the fraction of payments attributable to global
payments are equal to the insurer’s overall average.
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go beyond just including or excluding hospitals from a network. Existing Nash bargaining
models cannot accommodate the multiple possible outcomes inherent in a tiered hospital
network because they allow for only two distinct outcomes of a negotiation, agreement
and disagreement. In a tiered network, the agreement outcome between the insurer and
the hospital nests multiple possible tier placements. I incorporate the structure of tiered
networks by modeling all possible permutations of tier assignments for the hospital and its
close competitors and using insurers’ tier determination functions to assign a probability to
each permutation.
The bargaining model presented in this chapter highlights the trade-off hospitals face as a
result of tiered networks, between lower per-patient revenue and higher volume due to more
preferred tier placement. The model captures three channels through which hospital-insurer
negotiations are impacted by tiered networks. The first is the direct effect of an increase in
the negotiated price, which will raise the hospital’s surplus due to higher per-patient revenue
and reduce the insurer’s surplus. Second, the higher the negotiated price, the higher the
probability of the hospital’s placement into a non-preferred tier, which reduces the hospital’s
surplus due to loss of patient volume. Finally, there is an indirect effect of prices on
premiums, network valuation, and plan enrollments. Higher prices make hospital network
coverage less generous due to non-preferred tier placement, thereby reducing consumers’
willingness to pay for the insurer’s network, which may result in a loss of enrollees. On the
other hand, the less-preferred tier placement may also lead to lower total spending by the
plan, in which case premiums may fall enough to lead to a net increase in enrollment. The
net effect of a price increase is therefore ambiguous for the insurer. It is also ambiguous for
the hospital, and is a function of the fraction of the hospital’s volume that is attributable
to the insurers with which it has the highest negotiated prices.
The bargaining model presented in this chapter makes possible the study of how tiered hospital networks affect health care prices. By contrast, previous literature on tiered networks
has focused on demand-side responses to tiered networks (Scanlon et al., 2008; Sinaiko and
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Rosenthal, 2014; Frank et al., 2015). The pricing mechanisms described in this chapter
suggest that the effects of tiered networks are not limited to the demand-side effects discussed in Chapter 2. Instead, the effects of tiered networks on negotiated prices provide an
additional mechanism through which the demand-side savings from tiered networks can be
amplified by using the promise of increased patient volume to incentivize price reductions
by health care providers.

86

3.9. Tables and Figures
Figure 4: Harvard Pilgrim’s distribution of negotiated hospital prices (2011)

The distribution of hospital prices in Harvard Pilgrim’s network is smooth; notably, there is no bunching of
prices in regions that are on the threshold between tiers.
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Figure 5: Harvard Pilgrim’s negotiated hospital prices (2011) and hospital demand fixed effects
(a) Distribution of prices across tiers

(b) Distribution of demand FEs across tiers
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Figures 5a and 5b show the price and hospital demand fixed effects distributions by tie, where tier 1 is the most preferred tier with the lowest out-of-pocket
price. The black-bordered boxes represent the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile of the vertical axis quantity (hospital prices or demand fixed
effects) in each tier; the gray shaded areas represent densities. The bulk of the price distribution for each tier does not overlap with the bulk of the prices
in other tiers. The distribution of hospital demand fixed effects is comparable across tiers.

Figure 6: Mapping negotiated prices to tiers (Harvard Pilgrim)

Fitted generalized logistic functions mapping Harvard Pilgrim’s negotiated hospital prices to the hospitals’
probability of being in each tier, Gt (p), t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The stochastic, smooth nature of the price-to-tier
mapping implies that the model is smooth in negotiated prices.
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Table 18: Metropolitan Boston hospitals
Hospital
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Boston Medical Center
Tufts Medical Center
Cambridge Health Alliance - Cambridge Campus
Cambridge Health Alliance - Somerville Campus
Cambridge Health Alliance - Whidden Campus
Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital - Milton
Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital - Needham
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
Mount Auburn Hospital
Lawrence Memorial Hospital
Melrose-Wakefield Hospital
Brigham and Women’s Faulkner Hospital
Brigham and Women’s Hospital
Massachusetts General Hospital
Newton-Wellesley Hospital
Steward Carney Hospital
Steward St. Elizabeth’s Medical Center

System

Type

Cambridge Health Alliance
Cambridge Health Alliance
Cambridge Health Alliance
CareGroup
CareGroup
CareGroup
CareGroup
Hallmark Health Systems
Hallmark Health Systems
Partners HealthCare System
Partners HealthCare System
Partners HealthCare System
Partners HealthCare System
Steward Health Care System
Steward Health Care System

AMC
AMC
Teaching
Teaching
Teaching
Community
Community
AMC
Teaching
Community
Community
Teaching
AMC
AMC
Community
Teaching
Teaching

Hospitals’ system memberships are reported for 2011. Boston Medical Center and Tufts Medical Center do
not belong to systems. Hospital types are categorized as academic medical centers (AMC); community
hospitals (Community); community Disproportionate Share Hospitals (DSH), as defined by CMS; or
teaching hospitals (Teaching).

Table 19: Hospital margins from bargaining model (%)
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Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital - Milton
Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital - Needham
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
Mount Auburn Hospital
Boston Medical Center
Brigham and Women’s Faulkner Hospital
Brigham and Women’s Hospital
Massachusetts General Hospital
Newton-Wellesley Hospital
Cambridge Health Alliance - Cambridge Campus
Cambridge Health Alliance - Somerville Campus
Cambridge Health Alliance - Whidden Campus
Lawrence Memorial Hospital
Melrose-Wakefield Hospital
Steward Carney Hospital
Steward St. Elizabeth’s Medical Center
Tufts Medical Center

System
1
1
1
1
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
6
6
7

Margin (%)
-21
-19
-7
26
-0
0
-1
-1
-3
0
-38
0
-2
1
-0
-1
-1

Insurer surp. ($)
3615
3615
3615
3615
2215
2608
2608
2608
2608
2408
2408
2408
3808
3808
2749
2749
2054

System surp. ($)
252
252
252
252
29
-18
-18
-18
-18
5
5
5
105
105
19
19
61

Implied price-cost margins (%) for metropolitan Boston hospitals from the bargaining model. Model assumes there is no inertia
in plan enrollment and scales up competing insurers’ prices by 10%.

CHAPTER 4 : Aggregate Effects of Tiered Networks
The primary question of this dissertation is how health care demand, prices, and spending
respond to tiered provider networks. I therefore conduct counterfactual exercises that examine the impact of tiered networks on the demand side alone, holding prices fixed; and using
the model from Chapter 3 that allows hospital prices to adjust in new equilibria. Chapter
2 shows that consumers indeed respond to the incentives in tiered provider networks and
provides the first estimates of consumer response to differential out-of-pocket pricing in
these plans. These findings build on the existing literature on tiered networks, which has
examined hospitals’ categorical tier placement and therefore does not allow a comparison
the effects of tiered networks that use different out-of-pocket price arrangements (Scanlon
et al., 2008; Sinaiko and Rosenthal, 2014; Frank et al., 2015). In this chapter, I use the
estimates of consumer response to out-of-pocket prices in tiered networks to examine the
effects of three separate out-of-pocket price schedules.
Given that tiered networks can steer consumers toward lower-priced hospitals, Chapter
3 shows how insurers can use non-preferred tier placement as an additional bargaining
lever in price negotiations with hospitals. In evaluating the spending reduction effects of
tiered networks and similar demand-side incentives, it is necessary to consider their impacts
on negotiated prices between insurers and providers in addition to their direct effects on
demand. In this chapter, I evaluate the supply-side effects of tired networks by using
the bargaining model to simulate hospital prices under three separate out-of-pocket price
schedules.

4.1. Demand Effects of Tiered Networks
To evaluate the effect of tiered networks on the demand side alone, I compare predicted
inpatient hospital spending in Harvard Pilgrim’s largest tiered plan in three scenarios: a nontiered network using flat hospital copays; a tiered network using copays of $250, $500, and
$750 for its three tiers (the actual network); and the same tiered network but with a copay
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of $1,500 instead of $750 for the least preferred tier. The comparison of spending under
the observed tiered network to a non-tiered network allows me to evaluate the demand-side
effect of moving from a traditional health plan to a tiered hospital network. The third
scenario with the $1,500 copay for the least preferred tier (tier 3) is motivated by the actual
increase of the Harvard Pilgrim GIC plan’s tier 3 copay starting in fiscal year 2016, which
was implemented due to a sense that the previous copay differences of $250 between tiers
were not sufficient for steering demand away from the highest-priced Partners hospitals.
The demand-side counterfactuals use the same sample of households as the bargaining model
first-order conditions in Section 3.7. I simulate hospital shares for each patient-diagnosis pair
using the hospital demand estimates from Section 2.1.3, assuming all households are enrolled
in a full-network Harvard Pilgrim plan. These patient-diagnosis-hospital–level observations
are then collapsed by diagnosis probabilities and across tiers to obtain overall hospital
shares and spending. The three counterfactual scenarios of flat networks, the observed
tiered network, and a tiered network with a higher non-preferred tier copay are simulated
by assigning the appropriate copays to each of the hospital tiers. In the flat network,
hospitals in all tiers of Harvard Pilgrim’s network are assigned an identical copay of $250.
In these analyses, I hold Harvard Pilgrim’s negotiated hospital prices, hospital tiers, and
plan premiums fixed in order to isolate the demand effect of tiered networks from the
supply-side response.
Table 20 presents the results of the demand-side counterfactuals for the Massachusetts
statewide sample and for the Boston sample, respectively. The table presents the distribution of hospital volumes and mean spending per admission across the three scenarios:
the baseline non-tiered network, a tiered network with copays of $250, $500, and $750, and
the same tiered network but with copays of $250, $500, and $1,500. From left to right,
the spread in out-of-pocket price across the least to most preferred hospital tiers rises from
$0 to $1,250. For the Boston sample, the outside option is defined as any hospital outside
of metropolitan Boston, and its price to the insurer is taken to be the median price of
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non-Boston hospitals.
Hospitals in the more preferred tiers, 1 and 2, gain volume as patients are faced with larger
out-of-pocket price spreads between preferred tier and tier 3 hospitals. Statewide, hospitals
in the tier 3 as a group lose 4.3% to 13.0% of their baseline volume as patients are moved
from a flat network to a tiered network (Table 20a). By contrast, tier 1 hospitals gain 5.3%
to 10.6% of their baseline volume. Total spending per hospital admission falls by 0.7% going
from a flat network to a tiered network with a small copay differential across tiers, and by
an additional 1.1% moving to the tiered network with the larger copay differential across
tiers. For the statewide sample, the total savings gained from moving from a flat network
to a tiered network are small: $45 per patient per year for the network with copays of $250,
$500, and $750; and $112 per patient per year for the network with copays of $250, $500,
and $1,500. By comparison, the total annual premium for individual coverage in Harvard
Pilgrim’s largest tiered network plan ranges between $6,000 and $8,000 throughout the
sample period.
In the Boston sample, the greater responsiveness of patients to differential out-of-pocket
prices across tiers (see Section 2.1.3) leads to substantially larger shifts in hospital volume
due to the introduction of tiering (Table 20b). Tier 3 hospitals lose 20.6% to 55.1% of their
baseline volume of Boston area patients as those patients are moved from a flat network
to a tiered network. Tier 1 hospitals gain 24.6% to 42.6% of their baseline Boston area
patient volume, and more patient volume shifts to hospitals outside of metropolitan Boston.
Moreover, volume shifts across hospital tiers in the Boston market have larger effects on
spending than would similar volume shifts statewide. This is due to the fact that the key tier
3 hospitals in Boston, Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham and Women’s Hospital,
have much higher prices even than other tier 3 hospitals in the state. Shifting volume away
from these two Partners HealthCare System flagship hospitals therefore has a large effect
on the insurer’s bottom line. For the Boston sample, the total savings gained from moving
from a flat network to a tiered network are a sizable 3.5% to 8.1% of baseline inpatient
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spending.
The incidence of these spending differences is not symmetric across consumers and the
insurer, in both the statewide sample and the Boston sample. Consumers’ mean out-ofpocket spending rises as copay differentials increase, because demand for the non-preferred
tier hospitals remains positive. The insurance plans also provide less risk-smoothing the
larger is the spread in out-of-pocket prices across tiers. The overall welfare consequences
of tiered networks therefore depend on how consumers trade off lower premiums against
higher and more variable out-of-pocket costs.

4.2. Price Effects of Tiered Networks
Tiered networks affect not only the sorting of consumers across hospitals but also the prices
insurers negotiate with those hospitals. I now evaluate the effect of tiered networks taking
both the demand side and price-setting into account. I consider the supply-side equivalents
of the counterfactual scenarios above: non-tiered plans with a flat copay across hospitals
(the baseline); a tiered plan using copays of $250, $500, and $750; and a tiered plan using
copays of $250, $500, and $1,500.
Due to the complexity of this bargaining game for multi-hospital systems, I conduct the
pricing counterfactual analyses only for the standalone hospitals in the Boston market:
Boston Medical Center and Tufts Medical Center. Boston Medical Center and Tufts Medical
Center are both moderately large academic medical centers with bed counts between 400
and 500. They are affiliated with Boston University and Tufts University, respectively. I
allow hospital demand, GIC plan premiums and enrollment, and these hospitals’ prices
and tiers to adjust to the new market conditions. Prices for competing hospitals belonging
to systems are fixed at their observed values, rather than endogenized. Due to the high
computational cost of each iteration, I use a random subsample of 100 households from
Section 3.7 for the demand portion of the counterfactual calculation.
I use the hospital and plan demand estimates from Chapter 2 and the bargaining model
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from Chapter 3 to simulate negotiated prices under the three counterfactual scenarios of flat
networks, the observed tiered network, and a tiered network with a higher non-preferred
tier copay. In addition to allowing hospital demand to respond to network design as in
the demand-side counterfactuals above, GIC households are also allowed to re-sort across
insurance plans in response to changes in networks and premiums. An equilibrium consists
of negotiated prices and the corresponding tier placement probabilities, plan premiums,
plan enrollments, and hospital folumes for each possible network tier permutation. The
counterfactuals are solved by the following iterative algorithm.
1. Define network designs for the counterfactual exercise. Initialize prices at starting
values.
2. Using prices from previous iteration and the price-to-tier mapping, find the probability
associated with each possible permutation of hospital tiers. Simulate new hospital
volumes for each permutation of tiers.
3. Using prices from previous iteration and hospital volumes from Step 2, simulate new
hospital network WTP and new plan enrollments in order to find plan premiums
consistent with MLR premium-setting. Repeat this step until premiums converge.
4. Using hospital volumes from Step 2 and plan enrollments and premiums from Step
3, find the insurer’s and hospital’s surpluses from agreement corresponding to each
pairwise negotiation as a function of price.
5. Using surplus as a function of price from Step 4, find new prices that maximize the
Nash bargaining products.
6. If prices have converged with respect to the supremum norm, stop. Otherwise, increment the iteration counter and return to Step 2.
Table 21 presents the results of the pricing counterfactual analyses. I report changes from
baseline prices due to data use agreement restrictions on reporting actual prices. The use
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of tiered hospital networks has a sizable impact on negotiated prices. In a tiered network,
hospitals stand to gain volume by agreeing to a lower price that gives them a greater
probability of preferred tier status and therefore lower consumer out-of-pocket prices. Under
the market conditions in my data, this positive volume effect of lower prices outweighs the
negative effect of lower per-patient revenues, resulting in lower average prices when a tiered
network is implemented. In moving from a traditional, flat-copay plan to tiered networks
with copays of $250/$500/$750, prices are reduced by 2.4% to 2.8%. Further increasing
the spread in copays to $250/$500/$1,500 reduces prices by 3.8% to 4.1%, relative to the
baseline of no tiering.
The magnitudes of these price changes should be interpreted with caution, since this counterfactual exercise approximates the full equilibrium by holding fixed the prices of those
hospitals which belong to hospital systems. Allowing all hospitals’ prices to adjust would
further shift the price-to-tier mapping, potentially affecting the negotiations. The likely
effect of allowing full adjustment will be to partially attenuate the price reduction effects
implied by my analysis. In addition, “star” hospitals commanding a high preference among
consumers may have smaller losses in volume from remaining in the least preferred tier,
and may therefore be less affected by the downward pressure on prices exerted by tiered
networks. The standalone hospitals that are the subject of this counterfactual analysis have
among the highest demand preference among consumers after the Harvard-affiliated Partners and CareGroup hospitals, making them closer comparisons to “star” hospitals than to
local community hospitals in terms of demand responses. Although the precise values of
price responses shown in Table 21 may change in analyses using a larger sample of hospitals,
the direction and order of magnitude of the price changes are likely capturing meaningful
market dynamics.

4.3. Conclusion
The effects of tiered hospital networks on prices are equivalent to approximately half the
magnitude of the effects on demand steering alone (Table 20a). This suggests that focusing
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evaluations of plan designs like tiered networks on the demand-side effects alone underestimates the total expected savings by as much as a third. Moreover, the bulk of the price
effects of tiered networks manifest even at relatively modest spreads in copays between the
most and least preferred tiers. In this case, a tiered network with a $750 copay for the least
preferred tier achieves over 60% of the price reduction from a tiered network with a $1,500
copay for the least preferred tier. These results suggest that tiered networks may have substantial downward effects on hospital prices, even when the spread in out-of-pocket prices
across tiers is modest as a fraction of total negotiated prices. By sensitizing consumers to
negotiated prices and aggregating demand responses across many consumers, the effects of
demand-side incentives on insurers and hospitals can be substantial.
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4.4. Tables and Figures
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Table 20: Demand counterfactuals: demand-side effects of tiered networks
(a) Results for Massachusetts statewide sample

Tier 1 hospitals % of volume
Tier 2 hospitals % of volume
Tier 3 hospitals % of volume
Patient spending per admission ($)
∆ patient spending over flat copay (%)
Insurer spending per admission ($)
∆ insurer spending over flat copay (%)
Total spending per admission ($)
∆ total spending over flat copay (%)

Flat copay $250
26.36
37.49
36.14
250.00
0.00
36125.64
0.00
36370.88
0.00

$250/$500/$750
27.75
37.66
34.59
517.09
106.84
35595.06
-1.47
36101.69
-0.74

$250/$500/$1,500
29.15
39.42
31.44
741.51
196.60
34974.11
-3.19
35698.52
-1.85

(b) Results for Boston sample
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Outside option % of volume
Tier 1 hospitals % of volume
Tier 2 hospitals % of volume
Tier 3 hospitals % of volume
Patient spending per admission ($)
∆ patient spending over flat copay (%)
Insurer spending per admission ($)
∆ insurer spending over flat copay (%)
Total spending per admission ($)
∆ total spending over flat copay (%)

Flat copay $250
17.77
9.75
42.30
30.18
250.00
0.00
45860.93
0.00
46110.93
0.00

$250/$500/$750
21.20
12.15
42.70
23.96
423.54
69.42
44073.20
-3.90
44496.75
-3.50

$250/$500/$1,500
23.49
13.90
49.06
13.56
483.37
93.35
41902.89
-8.63
42386.25
-8.08

Demand-side effects of tiered networks for the statewide sample and the Boston sample, respectively, holding prices and enrollments fixed. The first column
is the baseline scenario: a traditional hospital network with no tiering and a flat copay across all hospitals. The second column is Harvard Pilgrim’s largest
tiered network plan in 2011, with tier copays of $250, $500, and $750 across its three tiers, respectively. The third column is the same as the second except
that the copay for tier 3 hospitals is $1,500. Tiered networks shift greater volume toward preferred-tier hospitals, but patients pay a larger share of the
price on average.

Table 21: Price effects of tiered networks
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Demand FE
Hospital share (%)
%∆ price (hospital)
No tiers to $250/$500/$750
No tiers to $250/$500/$1,500

Boston Medical Center
1.67
7.27

Tufts Medical Center
2.54
9.09

-2.76
-4.08

-2.43
-3.84

Price effects of tiered networks for the two standalone (non-system) hospitals in Boston, Boston Medical Center and Tufts Medical Center. Counterfactuals
conducted for Harvard Pilgrim, allowing premiums, enrollments, and these hospitals’ prices and tiers to adjust. The top row of the bottom panel reports
how prices change when moving from the baseline scenario of a non-tiered network with a flat copay to a scenario consistent with Harvard Pilgrim’s largest
tiered network plan in 2011, with tier copays of $250, $500, and $750 across its three tiers, respectively. The second row reports the effects on prices of
moving from the baseline scenario to a tiered network plan with tier copays of $250, $500, and $1,500, respectively.

CHAPTER 5 : Conclusion
This dissertation argues that the recent shift toward demand-side incentives in health insurance can indeed reduce health care spending. Insurance design innovations that aim
to sensitize demand to health care prices, such as value-based insurance, narrow provider
networks, high-deductible health plans, reference pricing, and tiered provider networks, are
becoming increasingly common. These plan designs aim to inject price competition into the
health care market by incentivizing consumers to select providers at least partially based on
price. If successful, such plan designs can be expected to affect not only consumer decisions
but also, by extension, equilibrium prices for health care. In this dissertation, I use the
Massachusetts private health insurance market as the empirical setting to study both of
these effects in the context of tiered provider networks.
In Chapter 2, I show that health insurance plan designs with tiered hospital networks
can steer patients toward lower-priced care. Consumer responses to differential out-ofpocket pricing in tiered networks are estimated using unique longitudinal data on hospital
networks and state-level all-payer claims data. The results show that consumers respond
to price incentives by substituting toward lower-priced providers, and that the magnitude
of this response depends on consumer characteristics and the concentration of health care
providers. Furthermore, estimates using data on plan choice sets and plan characteristics for
Massachusetts public employees show that households respond to hospital network design at
the ex ante stage of health insurance plan choice. The results of the plan demand analyses
also provide additional evidence for consumer inertia in health insurance plan enrollment.
Chapter 4 uses the results from Chapter 2 to find the expected spending reduction from
moving a fixed patient population from a traditional plan design to a tiered hospital network.
The results show that tiered networks can be expected to reduce spending on hospital care by
1% to 8% simply by steering patient volume toward lower-priced hospitals. The magnitude
of the expected spending reduction is greater when consumers are more responsive to out-
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of-pocket price, when there is a larger choice set of providers between which consumers can
substitute, and when the spread between the highest and lowest prices in the market is
greater.
The hospital and plan demand responses documented in Chapter 2 change the incentive
structure on the supply side by giving insurers the additional bargaining lever of tier status
in their price negotiations with hospitals. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical framework that
describes how the demand-side effects of tiered networks affect price negotiations between
insurers and hospitals. In agreeing to a lower negotiated price, a hospital trades off lower
per-patient revenue against higher volume due to more preferred tier placement. Plan
premiums and enrollments also respond to prices and tiers, affecting both insurers’ and
hospitals’ volumes. The pricing mechanisms described in this chapter suggest that the
effects of tiered networks are not limited to the demand-side effects discussed in Chapter 2.
Chapter 4 uses the bargaining model and demand estimates from prior chapters to evaluate the equilibrium effects of tiered networks on negotiated hospital prices for a subset of
metropolitan Boston hospitals. The results show that tiered networks can be expected to
reduce spending on hospital care by 2% to 4% via reductions in negotiated prices, over and
above their effect on steering patient volume toward lower-priced hospitals. In total, tiered
networks have a material effect on the demand for hospital care and the prices paid for that
care, as high as a 12% savings under the most favorable market conditions.
My findings highlight the importance of considering not only the immediate demand-side
effects of insurance designs with demand-side incentives, but also their impacts on the supply
side. Price negotiations between insurers and hospitals are responsive to the aggregate
effects of demand responses by individual consumers. These supply-side effects constitute
as much as one third of the total expected savings from tiered networks. To my knowledge,
this dissertation is the first to analyze empirically the construction of complex health care
provider networks that go beyond the simple inclusion or exclusion of providers. I build
on approaches from the bargaining estimation literature in industrial organization to shed
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light on issues of interest in health insurance design and the demand for health care. Taken
together, the demand- and supply-side results in this dissertation provide a cautiously
optimistic prognosis for demand-side incentives in health insurance.
The magnitude of potential savings from demand-side incentives will be greater when consumers can more easily substitute across health care treatments or providers in response to
such incentives. Larger savings can therefore be expected using health insurance designs
that are simple for consumers to understand; in markets with abundant options among
which consumers can choose; and among more informed or more price-sensitive consumer
populations. Although demand-side incentives can be successful in steering consumers toward lower-priced care, this steering comes at the expense of higher consumer out-of-pocket
spending and muted risk-smoothing. Moreover, to the extent that low income is correlated
with high price sensitivity and to the extent that prices are correlated with health care
quality, plan designs using demand-side incentives may have distributional consequences
if they disproportionately discourage the use of high-quality health care providers among
low-income individuals. While assessing the presence and magnitude of such distributional
effects of tiered networks is beyond the scope of this work, these issues remain important
for health care policy.
These findings build toward a more complete understanding of the effects of demand-side
incentives on health care spending. Extending this work to account for the broader equilibrium impacts of tiered networks on multiple insurers and a larger set of hospitals is a
natural direction for future research. More broadly, I provide a new framework that can be
used to analyze hospital pricing under various types of complex insurance designs. As the
market penetration of such insurance innovations continues to rise, so too will the importance of explicitly accounting for them in analyses of the health care market, especially in
applied areas such as antitrust evaluations. The effectiveness of demand-side incentives for
reducing health care spending can be improved by careful policy design that accounts for
the upstream effects of demand incentives on health care prices.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: List of Notation
Symbols used throughout the dissertation are listed in the following table in alphabetical
order. Greek letters are included at their analogous place in the English alphabet, e.g. δ is
included with entries for the letter D. The table continues on the next page.
Symbol

Description

α

Demand coefficient on hospital out-of-pocket price

β

Demand coefficient vector on hospital and patient characteristics

bM(h) , bh(M)

Insurer M’s and hospital h’s Nash bargaining weights w.r.t each other

cmh

Plan m’s copay for hospital h

Cmhi

Consumer i’s total expected out-of-pocket payments to hospital h
under plan m

d

Index of diagnosis categories, d ∈ D

δ1

Demand coefficient on plan premium

δ2

Demand coefficient on WTP for plan’s hospital network

εmhid

Error term in hospital demand model

fid

Consumeri’s probability of contracting diagnosis d

GtM (pMh )

Probability that hospital with price pMh is in tier t of insurer M’s
network

t (p
gM
Mh )

Derivative of GtM (pMh ) with respect to price

τ
GMh

Product of of probabilities of network tier permutation τ for all
hospitals except h

γ

Demand coefficient vector on plan characteristics

i

Index of individual consumers

ι

Index of households, ι ∈ I

h, j

Index of hospitals, h, j ∈ H
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kh

Hospital h’s baseline marginal cost for a patient with diagnosis
weight ld = 1

ld

Diagnosis d’s multiplier for scaling price and hospital cost

λ

Medical loss ratio (MLR)

M, N

Index of insurers, M, N ∈ M

m, n

Index of insurance plans, m ∈ M, n ∈ N

pMh

Base price negotiated between insurer M and hospital h

ΠM

Insurer M’s expected profit

Πh

Hospital h’s expected profit

rmι

Plan m’s premium for household of size ι

smι

Household ι’s probability of enrolling in plan m

SM(h)

Insurer M’s expected surplus in negotiations with hospital h

Sh(M)

Hospital h’s expected surplus in negotiations with insurer M

Sh

Set of hospitals belonging to the same system as h

σmhid

Consumer i’s probability of choosing hospital h in plan m
with diagnosis d

t

Indexes individual hospitals’ network tiers, t ∈ {1, 2, 3}

τ

Indexes permutations of all hospitals’ network tiers, τ ∈ T

umhid

Consumer i’s utility from hospital h in plan m with diagnosis d

Umι

Household ι’s utility from plan m

Vmhi

Hospital h’s total expected casemix-adjusted volume for
consumer i in plan m

Wmi , Wmι

Consumer i’s and household ι’s WTP for plan m’s hospital
network

xhid

Hospital and patient characteristics in hospital demand model

Xm

Plan m’s characteristics in plan demand model

ζmι

Error in plan demand model
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Appendix B: Level Shifts in WTP and Identification
This section discusses the identification of WTP for hospital networks from Section 2.2.1
within versus across individuals. The consumer surplus in discrete choice models is generally
identified only up to a level shift, denoted here by C (Train, 2002). Thus, differences in
willingness to pay across networks or plans are meaningful while the absolute level is not.
In the context of willingness-to-pay for a product whose probabilities of any consumption
vary across individuals, as with hospital care, this property has important implications for
comparing consumer surplus across individuals. Consider a constant level shift v affecting
all exponentiated terms for all individuals. This implies a shifted willingness-to-pay of


Wmi (v) =



X
1 X
fid ln 
exp (αcmh + βxhid + v) + C
α d∈D
h∈H


=



X
1 X
fid ln H exp(v) ·
exp (αcmh + βxhid ) + C
α d∈D
h∈H

= Wmi + Ci (v)

where Ci (v) =

1
α

P

d∈D fid (ln(H)

+ v) is a shift that may be heterogeneous across indi-

viduals. Individuals or households with lower price sensitivity α and those with higher
probabilities of hospital admission

P

d∈D fid

will experience a greater shift in willingness-

to-pay. This has the effect that the level shift of willingness-to-pay between individuals will
vary depending on, say, which hospital is designated as the baseline in a model with hospital fixed effects. However, the shift Ci (v) is constant for all networks within an individual
or household. The variation generated by predicted willingness-to-pay therefore remains
informative for estimating plan choice models, which are identified from differences across
choice alternatives within rather than across households. While the heterogeneous shifts
across individuals are intuitive in the case of a hospital network, this property will also hold
for any other discrete choice model where demand coefficients or probabilities of product
purchase differ across individuals.
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Appendix C: Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 7: Hospital tiers for the largest three Massachusetts insurers (2012)
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Table 23: Enrollment in GIC plans
Plan

Share (%)

New policies

New enrollees

2009-2012 enrolt.

Fallon Direct
Fallon Select
Harvard Pilgrim Independence
Harvard Pilgrim Primary Choice
Health New England
Neighborhood Health Plan
Tufts Navigator
Tufts Spirit
UniCare Basic
UniCare Community Choice
UniCare PLUS

1.52
3.78
36.42
3.04
9.54
1.71
41.97
1.16

891
1, 286
16, 358
2, 079
3, 443
924
10, 137
1, 228

1, 543
2, 684
36, 444
4, 472
6, 451
1, 645
20, 438
2, 577

7, 177
11, 167
96, 103
22, 208
29, 312
7, 552
120, 519
13, 775
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GIC plan enrollment for employees and their dependents, excluding UniCare plans.
Share is market share is at the end of fiscal year 2011 (June 2011).
Enrollee and policy holder counts are for first-time GIC enrollees in 2009–June 2011.
Final column is total number of unique enrollees in 2009–2012.

Table 24: Hospital choice model

HospitalChoice
Copay (income Q1)
Copay (income Q2-4)
Copay (income Q5)
Distance (mi)
Distance2
Age × dist
Male × dist
Chronic cond × dist
Teaching × dist
Beds × dist
Satellite hosp campus
Cardiac CCS × cath lab
Obstetric CCS × NICU
Nerv, circ, musc CCS × MRI
Nerv CCS × neuro
% good pain control × dist
% highly recommend × dist
Hospital FEs
Observations
Pseudo R2

(1)
No FEs

(2)
Hospital FEs

0.00068∗∗∗
(0.00013)
0.00082∗∗∗
(0.00005)
0.00070∗∗∗
(0.00008)
-0.20096∗∗∗
(0.00166)
0.00053∗∗∗
(0.00001)
-0.00006∗
(0.00003)
0.00284∗∗
(0.00099)
0.01979∗∗∗
(0.00103)
0.01754∗∗∗
(0.00107)
0.00006∗∗∗
(0.00000)
-0.29251∗∗∗
(0.02148)
1.15067∗∗∗
(0.09551)
0.85982∗∗∗
(0.03463)
0.03747
(0.04932)
1.80914∗∗∗
(0.22686)
-0.00227∗∗∗
(0.00054)
0.01028∗∗∗
(0.00045)
No
1687820
0.457

-0.00032∗
(0.00015)
-0.00025∗∗∗
(0.00006)
-0.00022∗
(0.00009)
-0.20003∗∗∗
(0.00187)
0.00071∗∗∗
(0.00001)
-0.00010∗∗∗
(0.00003)
0.00066
(0.00102)
0.02047∗∗∗
(0.00108)
-0.00588∗∗∗
(0.00138)
0.00004∗∗∗
(0.00000)
18.35662
(1753.65494)
0.67128∗∗∗
(0.09953)
0.32700∗∗∗
(0.03874)
-0.10803
(0.06137)
0.20747
(0.24528)
-0.00536∗∗∗
(0.00060)
0.00471∗∗∗
(0.00057)
Yes
1687820
0.529

Standard errors in parentheses
N = number of admission-hospital pairs. All specifications estimated using multinomial logit.
Hospital quality variables are standardized.
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

p < 0.001
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Table 25: Hospital choice model (with control function)

Hospital Choice
Copay (dollars)
Distance (mi)
Distance2
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Hospital FEs
CF degree 1
CF degree 2
CF degree 3
CF degree 4
CF degree 5
Observations
Pseudo R2

(1)
Pref. spec

(2)
+IV sample

(3)
IV deg1

(4)
IV deg2

(5)
IV deg3

(6)
IV deg4

(7)
IV deg5

-0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0001)
-0.1998∗∗∗
(0.0019)
0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0000)
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
1689941
0.529

-0.0002∗
(0.0001)
-0.1986∗∗∗
(0.0023)
0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0000)
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
1107964
0.538

-0.0002∗
(0.0001)
-0.1993∗∗∗
(0.0026)
0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0000)
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
1107467
0.538

-0.0002∗
(0.0001)
-0.1993∗∗∗
(0.0027)
0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
1107467
0.538

-0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0002)
-0.2007∗∗∗
(0.0027)
0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
1107467
0.538

-0.0010∗∗∗
(0.0002)
-0.2009∗∗∗
(0.0027)
0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1107467
0.538

-0.0009∗∗
(0.0003)
-0.2008∗∗∗
(0.0027)
0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1107467
0.538

Standard errors in parentheses
N = number of admission-hospital pairs.
All specifications estimated using multinomial logit.
IV columns reported with boostrapped standard errors with 100 replications.
Hospital quality variables are standardized.
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

p < 0.001

Table 26: Hospital choice model: Boston (with control function)

Hospital Choice
Copay ($)
Outside option
Distance (mi)
Distance2
112

Hospital FEs
CF degree 1
CF degree 2
CF degree 3
CF degree 4
CF degree 5
Observations
Pseudo R2

(1)
Pref. spec

(2)
+IV sample

(3)
IV deg1

(4)
IV deg2

(5)
IV deg3

(6)
IV deg4

(7)
IV deg5

-0.0010∗∗∗
(0.0001)
-2.0945∗∗∗
(0.1221)
-0.3579∗∗∗
(0.0189)
0.0063∗∗∗
(0.0006)
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
101999
0.293

-0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0002)
-2.1387∗∗∗
(0.1669)
-0.3796∗∗∗
(0.0244)
0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0007)
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
64794
0.304

-0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0002)
-2.1739∗∗∗
(0.1473)
-0.3791∗∗∗
(0.0247)
0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
64794
0.304

-0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0003)
-2.2331∗∗∗
(0.1606)
-0.3781∗∗∗
(0.0250)
0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
64794
0.304

-0.0012∗∗
(0.0004)
-2.1495∗∗∗
(0.2434)
-0.3792∗∗∗
(0.0248)
0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
64794
0.304

-0.0014∗∗
(0.0005)
-2.2394∗∗∗
(0.2766)
-0.3777∗∗∗
(0.0250)
0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
64794
0.304

-0.0009
(0.0005)
-1.9441∗∗∗
(0.2946)
-0.3836∗∗∗
(0.0249)
0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
64794
0.304

Standard errors in parentheses
N = number of admission-hospital pairs.
All specifications estimated using multinomial logit.
IV columns reported with boostrapped standard errors with 100 replications.
IV columns reported with boostrapped standard errors with 100 replications.
IV columns use a subsample of the full data. Hospital quality variables are standardized.
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

p < 0.001

Table 27: Household WTP for plan networks

Household size
Youngest household member age
Oldest member age, if household size>1
Narrow network × household size
Tiered network × household size
Narrow tiered network × household size
Observations
Pseudo R2

(1)
WTP
493.58∗∗∗ (93.00)
-2.09
(3.25)
1.48
(3.41)
-292.74∗∗∗ (21.72)
66.13∗∗∗
(12.84)
-146.02∗∗ (48.37)
8100

Estimated using OLS. N = plan-year-household triplets.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by household.
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